As explained in the preceding chapter, this term is most probably related to the verb pacinati, "to know," and means "to be made known" or "to be confessed." There are 92 rules in this category, divided into eight chapters of ten each, and one of twelve.

Part One: The Lie Chapter

1. A deliberate lie is to be confessed.

"Now at that time Hatthaka the Sakyan had been overthrown in debate. In discussions with adherents of other sects, he acknowledged points after having denied them, denied points after having acknowledged them, evaded one question with another, told deliberate lies, made an appointment (for a debate) but then didn't keep it. The adherents of other sects were offended and annoyed and spread it about...

"The bhikkhus heard them... and having approached Hatthaka the Sakyan, asked him: 'Is it true, friend Hatthaka, that in discussions with adherents of other sects, you acknowledged points after having denied them, denied points after having acknowledged them, evaded one question with another, told deliberate lies, made an appointment (for a debate) but then didn't keep it?'

"'Those adherents of other sects have to be beaten in some way or another. You can't just give them the victory!'"

A deliberate lie is a statement or gesture made with the purpose of misrepresenting the truth to someone else. According to the K/Commentary, a violation of this rule requires two factors:

1) Intention: the intention to misrepresent the truth; and

2) Effort: the effort to make another individual know whatever one wants to communicate based on that intent.

Intention. The desire to misrepresent the truth fulfills this factor regardless of what one's motives are. Thus "white lies," lies made with benevolent intentions (e.g., to a person whose state of mind is too weak to take the truth), and outrageous lies meant as jokes -- to amuse rather than deceive -- would all fall under this rule.

For this reason, a bhikkhu who wants to shield an emotionally weak person from harsh truths has to be very skillful in phrasing his statements. And any bhikkhu with an active sense of humor should be careful about how he expresses it, bearing in mind a famous passage from M.61: The Buddha shows an empty water dipper to Rahula, his son, telling him that anyone who feels no shame at uttering a deliberate lie is as empty of the virtues of a contemplative as the dipper is empty of water. He then advises Rahula to train himself: "I will not utter a deliberate lie, even for a laugh."

Effort. According to the Vibhanga, to misrepresent the truth means to say that one has seen X when one hasn't, that one hasn't seen X when one has, or that one has seen X clearly when one is in doubt about the matter. This pattern holds for the other senses -- hearing, smell, taste, touch, and ideation -- as well. Thus to repeat what one has heard, seen, etc., even if it actually is misinformation, does not count as a misrepresentation of the truth under this rule, since one is truthfully reporting what one has seen, etc. If, however, one says that one believes in such misinformation -- when one actually doesn't -- this would count as a misrepresentation of the truth, and so would fulfill this factor.

According to the Commentary, effort here covers falsehoods conveyed not only by speech but also by writing or gesture, as well as the act of remaining silent in situations where silence would convey a false message (as during the recitation of the Patimokkha, where silence on the part of the listener indicates that he has no unconfessed offenses).

Result is not a factor here. Thus whether or not anyone understands the lie or is deceived by it, is irrelevant to the offense.

In cases where a particular lie would fall under another rule -- such as Parajika 4, Sanghadisesas 8 or 9, Pacittiya 13, 24, or 76 -- the penalties assigned by that rule take precedence over the ones assigned here. For instance, making a false claim to a superior human state and not being understood would entail a thullaccaya under Parajika 4; falsely accusing another bhikkhu of a parajika offense would entail a sanghadisesa under Sanghadisesa 8; falsely accusing him of a sanghadisesa would entail a pacittiya under Pacittiya 76; and falsely accusing him of a lesser offense would entail a dukkata under that rule.

The Vinaya Mukha argues that this rule should take precedence in cases where a particular lie would entail only a dukkata under any of the other rules -- as in the last example -- but this contradicts the Vibhanga.

Non-offenses. A bhikkhu who misrepresents the truth unintentionally commits no offense under this rule. The Vibhanga gives two examples -- speaking quickly and saying one thing while meaning another -- and the Commentary explains them as follows: Speaking quickly means speaking before one has carefully considered the matter. Saying one thing while meaning another means making a slip of the tongue, either out of stupidity or carelessness. And, as we noted above, a bhikkhu who speaks from mistaken assumptions -- truthfully reporting any mistaken information he may have received or mistaken beliefs he may have thought up -- does not come under this rule.

Broken promises. The Mahavagga (III.14.1-14) imposes a dukkata on the act of making a promise with pure intentions but later breaking it. Since the texts make no mention of any circumstances beyond one's control that would exempt one from that penalty, a bhikkhu should be very careful of how he states his plans for the future. A special instance of breaking a promise -- accepting an invitation to a meal but then not going -- is treated under Pacittiya 33.

Summary: The intentional effort to misrepresent the truth to another individual is a pacittiya offense.

2. An insult is to be confessed.

An insult is a gesture or statement, written or spoken, made with the malicious intent of hurting another person's feelings or of bringing him/her into disgrace. The Vibhanga analyzes the full offense under this rule in terms of three factors:

1) Effort: One insults a person directly to his face, touching on any one of the 10 topics for abuse (akkosa-vatthu) discussed below.

2) Object: The person is a bhikkhu.

3) Intention: One wants to humiliate him for malicious reasons.

Effort. The Vibhanga lists ten ways a verbal insult can be phrased: making remarks about the other person's

race, class, or nationality (You nigger! You bum! You Jew!);

name (You really are a Dick!);

family or lineage (You bastard! You son of a bitch!);

occupation (You pimp! You capitalist pig!);

craft (What would you expect from a guy who crochets?);

disease or handicap (Hey, Clubfoot! Spastic!);

physical characteristics (Hey, Fatty! Beanpole! Shrimp! Hulk!);

defilements (You control freak! Fool! Queer! Breeder!);

offenses or attainments (Some stream-winner you are! You liar! You thief!); or

using an abusive form of address, such as, "You camel! You goat! You ass! You penis! You vagina!" (%) (All five of these come from the Vibhanga.)

These ten topics are called the akkosa-vatthu -- topics for abuse -- and appear in the following training rule as well.

As the examples in the Vibhanga show, the remark that fulfills the factor of effort here must touch on one of these topics for abuse and must be made directly to the listener: "You are X." It may be phrased either as sarcastic praise or as out-and-out abuse. The Commentary and Sub-commentary say that any insulting remark not listed in the Vibhanga would only be grounds for a dukkata, but the Vibhanga defines the topics for abuse in such a way that any term related to them in any way would fulfill this factor here.

Remarks made in an indirect or insinuating manner, though, would not fulfill this factor. Indirect remarks are when the speaker includes himself together with the target of his insult in his statement ("We're all a bunch of fools.") Insinuating remarks are when he leaves it uncertain as to whom he is referring to ("There are camels among us"). Any remark of this sort, if meant as an insult, entails a dukkata regardless of whether the target is a bhikkhu or not.

All of the insults mentioned in the Vibhanga take the form of remarks about the person, whereas insults and verbal abuse at present often take the form of command -- Go to hell! F -- off! etc. -- and the question is whether or not these too would be covered by this rule. Viewed from the standpoint of intent, they fit under the general definition of an insult; but if for some reason they would not fit under this rule, they would in most cases be covered by Pacittiya 54.

Insulting remarks made about someone behind his/her back are dealt with under Pacittiya 13.

Object. This factor is fulfilled for the full offense only if the target of one's insult is a bhikkhu. To insult an unordained person -- according to the Commentary, this runs the gamut from bhikkhunis to all other living beings -- entails a dukkata.

Intent. The Vibhanga defines this factor as "desiring to jeer at, desiring to scoff at, desiring to shame." If, with no insult intended, a bhikkhu jokes about another person's race, etc., he incurs a dubbhasita, regardless of whether the person is lay or ordained, mentioned outright or insinuatingly, and regardless of whether he/she takes it as a joke or an insult. This is the only instance of this class of offense.

The K/Commentary adds result as a fourth factor -- the target of one's insult knows, "He is insulting me" -- but there is no basis for this in either the Vibhanga or the Commentary. If one makes an insulting remark under one's breath, not intending to be heard, or in a foreign language, not intending to be understood, the intention would be to let off steam, which would not qualify as the intention covered by this rule. If one truly wants to humiliate someone, one will make the necessary effort to make that person hear and understand one's words -- but if for some reason that person doesn't hear or understand (a loud noise blots out one's words, one uses a slang term that is new to one's listener), there is nothing in the Vibhanga to indicate that one would escape from the full penalty.

For this reason, whether or not the person addressed actually feels insulted by one's remarks is of no consequence in determining the severity of the offense. If one makes a remark to a fellow bhikkhu, touching on one of the topics for abuse and meaning it as an insult, one incurs a pacittiya even if he takes it as a joke. If one means the remark as a joke, one incurs a dubbhasita even if the other person feels insulted.

Non-offenses. According to the Vibhanga, a bhikkhu who mentions another person's race, etc., commits no offense if he is "aiming at Dhamma, aiming at his benefit, aiming at teaching." The Commentary illustrates this with a bhikkhu saying to a member of the untouchable caste: "You are an untouchable. Don't do any evil. Don't be a person born into misfortune and going on to misfortune."

Another example would be of a teacher who uses insulting language to shame a stubborn disciple. This would entail no offense if done without malice, but one should be very sure of the purity of one's motives and of the beneficial effect of one's words before using language of this sort. The Cullavagga (IX.5.2) states that a bhikkhu is fit to reprove another bhikkhu only if he keeps five points in mind: "I will speak at the right time and not at the wrong time. I will speak about what is factual and not about what is not factual. I will speak with gentleness and not with harshness. I will speak about what is connected with the goal and not about what is not connected with the goal. And I will speak with thoughts of kindness and not with inner hatred."

Summary: An insult made with malicious intent to another bhikkhu is a pacittiya offense.

3. Malicious tale-bearing among bhikkhus is to be confessed.

Malicious tale-bearing is described in the Vibhanga as follows: X makes remarks about Y touching on his race, name, or any of the other ten akkosa-vatthu listed in the explanation to the preceding rule. Z, hearing these remarks, goes to tell someone else -- either W or Y himself -- in hopes of causing a rift between X and his listener, or of winning favor with his listener in case there is already a rift between the two. For example:

a) X calls Y a bastard behind his back. Z tells Y, in hopes of ingratiating himself with Y.

b) X makes racist remarks about Y to his face. Z knows that W is a friend of Y and hates racists, and so tells W what X said, in hopes of causing a rift between W and X.

Bhikkhu Z commits the full offense here when three factors are fulfilled: object, effort, and intent.

1) Object: Both Z's listener and X are bhikkhus; X has made remarks about Y that qualify as a direct insult under the preceding rule (or, if he didn't make them in Y's presence, remarks that would have qualified as a direct insult had he done so).

2) Effort: Z reports X's remarks to his listener verbally or by gesture (as in writing a letter),

3) Intent: with the intent of ingratiating himself with his listener, or of causing a rift between his listener and X.

The K/Commentary adds a fourth factor -- Z's listener understands what he is saying -- but as with the preceding rule, there is no basis for this in the Vibhanga.

Object. If either X or Z's listener -- or both -- are not bhikkhus, then the penalty for Z is a dukkata.

If X's remarks qualified only as an indirect insult under the preceding rule -- e.g., he said with reference to Y that, "There are asses among us" -- then Z incurs a dukkata if he reports them with the intent to ingratiate himself or cause a rift, regardless of whether his listener and/or X are bhikkhus or not.

The Sub-commentary states that there is a dukkata for bearing tales dealing with matters other than remarks about the ten akkosa-vatthu -- i.e., telling Y about things said or done by X, to make X appear in a bad light in hopes of winning favor or causing a rift, although some cases of this sort would come under Pacittiya 13.

Effort. This rule is sometimes translated as dealing with slander -- false tale-bearing -- but as the examples in the Vibhanga show, it actually deals with true tale-bearing: X really does say insulting things about Y, and Z gives a true report. The Vinaya Mukha comments that if Z engages in false tale-bearing, then regardless of whether or not X and Z's listener are bhikkhus, Z incurs the full penalty under Pacittiya 1.

Intent. To give a true report of such matters with motives other than those of winning favor or causing a rift entails no offense. Examples of this would include:

informing a senior bhikkhu when one bhikkhu has accused another of a serious offense, so that an inquiry can be made for the sake of harmony in the Community; or

telling a senior bhikkhu about a student of his who is making racist remarks, so that the senior bhikkhu can put a stop to it.

Summary: Tale-bearing among bhikkhus, in hopes of winning favor or causing a rift, is a pacittiya offense.

4. Should any bhikkhu have an unordained person recite Dhamma line by line (with him), it is to be confessed.

This is an offense with two factors:

1) Effort: One gets a student to recite Dhamma line-by-line with oneself (which, as we shall see below, means to train the student to be a skilled reciter of a Pali Dhamma text).

2) Object: The student is neither a bhikkhu nor a bhikkhuni.

Only the first factor needs explanation, and is best treated under two headings: Dhamma and reciting line-by-line.

Dhamma the Vibhanga defines as "a saying made by the Buddha, his disciples, seers, or heavenly beings, connected with the teaching or connected with the goal." The Commentary devotes a long discussion to these terms, coming to the conclusion that connected with the Dhamma refers to the Pali Canon -- in Pali, not in translation -- as agreed on in the first three councils, while connected with the goal (attha) refers to the Maha Atthakatha, the most revered ancient commentary (only in its original Pali version, the Sub-commentary says).

The ancient commentaries disagreed as to what other works would fit under this category, but Buddhaghosa's conclusion seems to be that -- in the Milinda Panha, for example -- Ven. Nagasena's quotes of the Buddha's words would count, but not his own formulations of the teaching, and the same principle holds for other texts that quote the Buddha's words as well. The ancient commentaries are unanimous, though, in saying that "Dhamma" does not cover the Mahayana sutras or compositions (this would include translations) dealing with the Dhamma in languages other than Pali.)

This interpretation, identifying "Dhamma" with particular Pali texts, has caused no controversy in the context of this rule -- although it seems unlikely that the compilers of the Vibhanga would have had the commentaries in mind when they said, "connected with the goal" -- but it has met with disagreement in the context of Pacittiya 7, and so we will discuss it there in more detail.

Reciting line-by-line. To make someone recite line by line means to train him/her by rote to be a skilled reciter of a text.

Bhikkhus in the days of the Buddha committed the teachings in the Canon to memory so as to preserve them from generation to generation. Although writing was in use at the time -- mainly for keeping accounts -- no one used it to record teachings either of the Buddha or of any other religious teacher. The Pali Canon was not written down until approximately 500 years after the Buddha's passing away, when repeated wars in Sri Lanka threatened its survival.

The Vibhanga lists four ways in which a person might be trained to be a reciter of a text:

1) The teacher and student recite in unison, i.e., beginning together and ending together.

2) The teacher begins a line, the student joins in, and they end together.

3) The teacher recites the beginning syllable of a line together with the student, who then completes it alone.

4) The teacher recites one line, and the student recites the next line alone.

Reciters of the Vedas still use these methods at present when practicing their texts.

The origin story states that the Buddha forbade these methods of training unordained people because they caused the lay students to feel disrespect for the bhikkhus. The Vinaya Mukha explains this by noting that if a teacher made a slip of the tongue while teaching in this way, his students would look down on him for it. If this were the right explanation, though, the no-offense clauses would have listed "proper" ways of training novices and lay people to recite the Dhamma, but they don't.

A more likely explanation is that at the time of the Buddha the duty of memorizing and reciting the texts was considered the province of the bhikkhus and bhikkhunis. Although some lay people memorized discourses (Mv.III.5.9), and bhikkhus of course taught the Dhamma to lay people, there was apparently the feeling that to teach non-ordainees to become skilled reciters of the texts was not good for the relationship between bhikkhus and laity. There are two possible reasons for this:

1) People may have felt that the bhikkhus were shirking their responsibilities by trying to pass their duty off onto lay people.

2) The Brahmans at the time were very strict in not allowing anyone outside their caste to memorize the Vedas, and their example may have led lay people to feel disrespect for bhikkhus who were not equally protective of their own tradition.

At present, the entire Canon is available in print, and even bhikkhus rarely commit it to memory, although they do frequently memorize parts of it, such as the Patimokkha, the major discourses, and other passages chanted on ceremonial occasions. To train a lay person or novice to become skilled in reciting such teachings by rote would entail the full penalty under this rule.

Perception and intent are not mitigating factors here. Thus a bhikkhu who trains a novice to recite a text in any of the ways mentioned above -- on the assumption that the novice is a bhikkhu -- incurs a pacittiya all the same. The same holds true for a bhikkhu training a mixed group of bhikkhus and novices, even if his intention is to train only the bhikkhus in the group.

Non-offenses. Since this rule is aimed at methods of teaching, the Vibhanga states that there is no offense "for one made to recite in unison." This, says the Commentary, refers to a young bhikkhu who is told by his teacher to recite together with a novice who is the teacher's student.

Also, there is no offense if a bhikkhu chants a passage in unison with unordained people who have already memorized it. The Commentary extends this allowance to include cases of bhikkhus learning a text from an unordained person, probably on the model of the Itivuttaka, which -- according to its Commentary -- the bhikkhus first learned from a servant woman who had memorized some of the Buddha's teachings that the bhikkhus had overlooked.

Finally, there is no offense if a bhikkhu corrects an unordained person who has memorized most of a passage or who is reciting in a confused manner.

Summary: To train a novice or lay person to recite passages of Dhamma by rote is a pacittiya offense.

5. Should any bhikkhu lie down in the same lodging with an unordained person for more than two or three consecutive nights, it is to be confessed.

As the Vinaya Mukha comments, "The Buddha originally laid down the rule forbidding the act of sleeping in the same lodging with an unordained person so that lay people would not see the unsightly attitudes a bhikkhu might assume while asleep. But then, when novices came into being, they were classed as unordained people and so had no place to stay. The Buddha therefore relaxed the rule, allowing bhikkhus to sleep in the same lodging with an unordained person no more than three nights running, thus also opening the way for them to sleep in the same lodging with ordinary lay men."

The occasion for the first formulation of the rule was this:

"Now at that time, lay men came to the monastery to hear the Dhamma. After the Dhamma had been taught, each of the elder bhikkhus went to his own dwelling, while the newer bhikkhus went to sleep right there in the attendance hall with the lay men -- careless, absent-minded, naked, mumbling, and snoring. The lay men were offended and annoyed and spread it about, 'How can revered people go to sleep careless, absent-minded, naked, mumbling, and snoring?'"

The occasion for the final formulation was this:

"The bhikkhus said to Ven. Rahula (who must have still been a novice at this point), 'There is a training rule laid down by the Blessed One that (a bhikkhu) should not lie down together with an unordained person. Find yourself a place to sleep.' So Ven. Rahula, not being able to find a place to sleep, went to sleep in the outhouse. Then the Blessed One, getting up towards the end of the night, went to the outhouse and on arriving cleared his throat. Ven. Rahula cleared his throat.

"'Who's there?'

"'It's me, sir -- Rahula.'

"'Why are you lying there?'

"So Ven. Rahula told him what had happened."

There are two factors for the full offense here:

1) Object: an unordained person.

2) Effort: (a) lying down, (b) in the same lodging with the unordained person, (c) for four nights running.

Object. The Vibhanga defines unordained person as anyone other than a bhikkhu. According to the Commentary, this includes not only human beings, but also any animal large enough to have intercourse with. The Sub-commentary, though, following the Three Ganthipadas, notes that this does not include female human beings, since there is another training rule, following immediately on this one, that deals specifically with them.

Lying down. To be lying down in the same lodging with someone else means to be prone at the same time as the other person is prone within the area defined as the lodging. This factor is fulfilled whether the bhikkhu lies down when the other person is already lying there, or vice versa, or both lie down at the same time. Although there are other training rules where lying down is included under the term sitting, sitting is not included under the term lying down here. Whether or not the bhikkhu or the other person falls asleep is of no account.

Lodging. The Vibhanga defines the lodging that can be grounds for a pacittiya here as a place completely roofed and completely walled, or mostly roofed and mostly walled. A place half-roofed and half-walled, it says, is grounds for a dukkata, while a place (a) fully roofed but with no wall (e.g., an open pavilion), (b) fully walled but with no roof (e.g., a corral), or (c) less than half-roofed and less than half-walled, is not grounds for an offense.

Buddhaghosa quotes the Maha Atthakatha, the major ancient commentary, as filling in all the other possibilities:

Grounds for a pacittiya: A place
fully roofed and mostly walled,
fully roofed and half-walled,
mostly roofed and half-walled,
mostly roofed and fully walled,
half-roofed and fully walled, or
half-roofed and mostly walled.

Grounds for a dukkata: A place
fully roofed and less than half-walled,
mostly roofed and less than half-walled,
less than half-roofed and fully walled, or
less than half-roofed and mostly walled.

Grounds for no offense: A place
half-roofed and less than half-walled,
less than half-roofed and half-walled, or
less than half-roofed and less than half-walled.

The Commentary notes that tents would fit under the definition of place here, and it would seem that vehicles -- caravans in the time of the Buddha; automobiles, trains, buses and airplanes in ours -- would fit here as well.

The same lodging. Unfortunately, the Vibhanga does not say how far the boundary of a "single lodging" would extend. For example, would each separate room in a house count as a separate lodging? Would the entire house? Would an entire apartment building be a single lodging? The Commentary tries to remedy this omission by introducing the factor of "having a single common entrance" or "being part of the same enclosure." (The Pali word it uses, ekupacara, has both meanings, and the Commentary makes use of both in its discussion.)

What it says is this: Even a seven-story palace or a building with 100 rooms would count as a single lodging if all the rooms make use of a common entrance. If there are several buildings in a single enclosure, and one can go from one to another without stepping on outside ground, they would count as part of the same lodging. If there is a building divided into units that are not connected by internal doorways, each unit having a separate entrance, the different units would count as separate lodgings. Locking or closing a door does not close off the doorway. Only if the door opening is bricked up or otherwise permanently sealed off does it no longer count as a doorway.

The Commentary admits that the "single entrance" factor is not mentioned in the Canon in connection with this rule but is borrowed from the Vibhanga to NP 2. It argues that this factor is unavoidably bound up in the concept of "walled and roofed," though, and illustrates its point as follows: There is a two-room dwelling, composed of an antechamber through which one must pass to get to the inner chamber. A bhikkhu is sleeping in the inner chamber, and an unordained person in the antechamber. Now suppose that a stubborn Vinaya student maintains that if the door between the two rooms is closed, the bhikkhu is sleeping in a separate lodging from the unordained person, while if the door is open, they are in the same lodging. His teacher then asks him, "Why are they in the same lodging if the door is open?"

"Because the two rooms share the same roof and walls."

"And if the door is closed, does that destroy the roof and walls they had in common?"

"No, of course not. But the enclosure in which the bhikkhu is sleeping is marked by the door."

This, the Commentary says, shows that the notion of enclosure is part and parcel of the concept of lodging, and that the stubborn student has defeated his own argument. Its reasoning here is probably more convincing in Pali than in English, since as we noted above, Pali uses the same word for enclosure and entrance, but even so the illustration does not carry much force when applied to such places as separate apartments in an apartment building and so leaves the issue unsettled as far as they are concerned.

The Vinaya Mukha notes that the factor introduced by the Commentary has implications that go far beyond the original purpose of this rule -- and of the following rule, in which the concept of "single lodging" is even more important. It suggests borrowing an additional factor from NP 2: the factor of separate residences or zones of ownership (the Pali word kula carries both meanings). Thus in a large building composed of separate residences -- such as an apartment building, a hotel or a hospital with private rooms -- it suggests that each separate residence count as a separate lodging.

Since the Canon gives no clear guidance on this point, the wise policy for an individual bhikkhu is to follow the views of the Community to which he belongs.

Nights here, as in other training rules, are counted by dawns. Thus, if a bhikkhu is sleeping in the same lodging with an unordained person but one of them gets up before dawn, that night does not count. If a bhikkhu has slept in the same lodging with an unordained person for two or three nights running but then skips a night, the consecutive series is broken. If he then sleeps in the same lodging with an unordained person another night, the counting starts again from one.

However, once he has slept in the same lodging with an unordained person three nights running, then if after sundown on the fourth night he reclines in the same lodging in which a lay person is reclining -- even if only for a moment -- he incurs a pacittiya.

The Commentary interprets the phrase "after sundown" as meaning any time on the fourth day. In other words, there is no need to wait until the next dawn to count the fourth period of sleeping together. As we noted above in the conclusion to the chapter on the Sanghadisesa rules, there was a tendency in the time of the Canon to call a 24-hour period of day and night a "night." Perhaps this period was felt to begin at sundown, just as we now feel that a 24-hour "day" begins at midnight.

The Commentary also states that the unordained person need not be the same person each of the four nights, and the same holds true for the lodging. In other words, if a bhikkhu lies down in a lodging with novice X one night, and then goes elsewhere and lies down in a lodging with layman Y the next night, and so on for four nights running, he commits an offense all the same.

Perception and intent are not mitigating factors here. Thus a bhikkhu lying down in the same lodging with a novice whom he thinks to be another bhikkhu commits an offense all the same, as does a bhikkhu who miscounts the nights and lies down in the same room with an unordained person for what he thinks is his third night when it is actually his fourth.

In fact, this is a training rule that one may break without ever realizing it. Suppose a novice comes to lie down in a room where a bhikkhu is sleeping, and then gets up to leave before the bhikkhu awakens. If he does this for four nights running, the bhikkhu incurs a pacittiya even though he may never have been aware of what the novice was doing. Rules like this are the reason why many bhikkhus make a practice of confessing offenses even when they are not consciously aware of having committed them.

Non-offenses. To lie down with an unordained person in a lodging that would qualify as grounds for a pacittiya or a dukkata is no offense as long as one does it no more than three days running. And there is no offense in lying down any number of consecutive nights with an unordained person in a lodging that would not qualify as grounds for an offense.

The Vinaya Mukha comments that although this rule as it presently stands no longer fulfills its original purpose, bhikkhus should keep the original purpose in mind and avoid sleeping in the same place with an unordained person whenever possible. It would also be a wise policy to avoid sleeping out in a public park, on a public beach, in an unwalled pavilion, etc., in full view of the public, even though no offense would be involved.

Summary: Lying down at the same time, in the same lodging, with a novice or layman for more than three nights running is a pacittiya offense.

6. Should any bhikkhu lie down in the same lodging with a woman, it is to be confessed.

There are only two differences between this rule and the preceding one:

1) The factor of "object" here is fulfilled only by a female human being, "even one born that day, all the more an older one," regardless of whether or not she is related to the bhikkhu.

2) The four-night clause under "effort" is dropped, which means that the bhikkhu incurs a pacittiya the instant he lies down in the same lodging with her.

Object. The Vibhanga states that female yakkhas, petas, nagas, devas, and animals -- as well as pandakas, as defined under Sanghadisesa 2 -- are grounds for a dukkata here. The Commentary qualifies this by saying that "female animal" means one with which it is possible to have intercourse, and "female yakkhas, petas, nagas, and devas" includes only those who make themselves visible.

Even if another man is present in the lodging, it does not negate the offense.

Perception and intent are not mitigating factors here. Thus a bhikkhu who sleeps in the same room with a woman he thinks to be a man -- e.g., she has disguised herself -- commits the full offense all the same. Also, a bhikkhu lying down in the same lodging with a woman commits an offense regardless or whether or not he realizes that she is there.

The same principles apply to pandakas: A bhikkhu who lies down in the same room with a pandaka whom he thinks to be an ordinary man commits a dukkata; and the same is true for a bhikkhu lying down in a lodging not knowing that a pandaka is also lying down there.

A single lodging is defined as in the preceding rule. Thus a bhikkhu sleeping in the same house as his mother, even if they are in separate rooms and another man is present, commits an offense all the same.

Effort. The main point where this rule differs from the preceding one under the factor of effort is that a bhikkhu incurs a pacittiya the moment he is lying in a lodging at the same time a woman is lying there, with no need to count nights or dawns. This is expressed in the Vibhanga by saying, "If at sunset a bhikkhu is lying when a woman is lying, it is to be confessed."

The Sub-commentary interprets this as meaning that this rule applies only at night, but the no-offense clauses in the Vibhanga give no exemptions for daytime, which suggests that the Sub-commentary's interpretation is invalid. What the Vibhanga's statement means is that there is no need to wait until dawn to count the period of lying down together. As we noted under the preceding rule, there was a tendency in the time of the Canon to call a 24-hour period of day and night a "night," and this period may have been felt to begin at sundown. The Commentary, switching to our current practice of calling a 24-hour period a day, says, "In the previous rule, the offense is on the fourth day. Here it is right from the first day."

Thus, no matter what time of day or night a bhikkhu lies down in the same lodging with a woman, he immediately incurs a pacittiya.

The purposes of this rule. Another difference between this rule and the preceding one is the obvious point that they have different purposes. As the origin story shows, this rule is to prevent situations that might tempt a bhikkhu to commit a serious offense, such as a Parajika 1 or Sanghadisesa 2.

"Then the woman, having prepared a bed inside (her house) for Ven. Anuruddha, having put on her jewelry and scented herself with perfumes, went to him and said, 'Master, you are beautiful, good-looking, and charming. I, too, am beautiful, good-looking, and charming. It would be good if I were to be your wife.'

"When she said this, Ven. Anuruddha remained silent. So a second time... a third time she said to him, 'Master, you are beautiful, good-looking, and charming. I too am beautiful, good-looking, and charming. Please take me together with all my wealth.'

"A third time, Ven. Anuruddha remained silent. So the woman, having slipped off her upper cloak, paraded up and down in front of him, stood, sat down, and then lay down right in front of him. But Ven. Anuruddha, keeping control of his faculties, didn't as much as glance at her or say even a word.

"Then it occurred to her: 'Isn't it amazing! Isn't it astounding! Many men send for me at a price of 100 or even 1,000 (a night), but this recluse, even when I myself beg him, doesn't want to take me together with all of my wealth!' So, putting her upper cloak back on and bowing her head at his feet, she said to him: 'Honored sir, a transgression has overcome me in that I acted in such a foolish, muddle-headed and ill-considered way. Please accept this confession of my transgression as such, so that I may restrain myself in the future.'"

Ven. Anuruddha was very advanced in the practice and so was able to get through the situation with his mindfulness and precepts intact. Many a lesser bhikkhu, though, would have succumbed right from the woman's first request, and so the Buddha formulated this rule for his protection.

This rule is also meant to prevent situations where suspicious people might think a bhikkhu had committed a serious offense even when he hadn't. Like Caesar's wife, a bhikkhu must not only be pure, he must look pure if he is to uphold the religion and maintain the reputation of the Community. If a bhikkhu and a woman are seen going into a house together in the evening and leaving together the following morning, then even if they slept in separate rooms, suspicious neighbors -- and very few neighbors aren't suspicious of bhikkhus -- would be quick to jump to conclusions. Thus the wise policy mentioned in the preceding rule applies even more forcefully here: A bhikkhu would be well-advised not to lie down with a woman in such places as parks, beaches, or unwalled pavilions even though in terms of the rules no offense would be involved.

There is some overlap between this rule and Pacittiyas 44 & 45, which deal with a bhikkhu sitting or lying down together in private with a woman (or women). Special cases covered by this rule not covered by those would include, for example, a bhikkhu and a woman lying down in separate rooms of the same lodging; a bhikkhu and a woman lying down in the same lodging with another man present. Also, under those rules, the questions of the bhikkhu's state of mind and his awareness of the situation are important factors. Here they are of no consequence: Even a bhikkhu with the purest state of mind -- or completely unknowingly -- incurs a pacittiya when lying down together with a woman in the same lodging.

Non-offenses. There is no offense in lying down with a woman in a lodging that under the preceding rule would not be grounds for an offense, i.e.,

fully roofed but with no walls (e.g., an open pavilion),
fully walled but with no roof (e.g., a corral),
half-roofed and half-walled,
half-roofed and less than half-walled,
less than half-roofed and half-walled,
less than half-roofed and less than half-walled.

Still, as noted above, a bhikkhu would be well-advised to avoid such situations whenever possible, and to have another man present when not.

Summary: Lying down at the same time in the same lodging with a woman is a pacittiya offense.

7. Should any bhikkhu teach more than five or six sentences of Dhamma to a woman, unless a knowledgeable man is present, it is to be confessed.

"Then Ven. Udayin, having dressed early in the morning and taking his robe and bowl, went to visit a certain family. At that time the lady of the house was sitting in the main entrance, while the daughter-in-law was sitting in the door to the inner chamber. So Ven. Udayin approached the lady of the house and whispered Dhamma into her ear. The daughter-in-law thought, 'Is this recluse my mother-in-law's lover, or is he being fresh with her?' Then, having whispered Dhamma into the ear of the lady of house, Ven. Udayin went to the daughter-in-law and whispered Dhamma into her ear. The lady of the house thought, 'Is this recluse my daughter-in-law's lover, or is he being fresh with her?' After whispering Dhamma into the daughter-in-law's ear, Ven. Udayin left. So the lady of the house said, 'Hey. What did that recluse say to you?'

"'He taught me Dhamma, ma'am. And what did he say to you?'

"'He taught me Dhamma, too.'

So they were offended and annoyed and spread it about, 'How can Ven. Udayin whisper Dhamma into women's ears? Shouldn't the Dhamma be taught openly and out loud?'"

The two factors for the full offense here are:

1) Object: a female human being who knows what is and is not lewd and who has not asked one a question about the Dhamma.

2) Effort: One teaches her more than six sentences of Dhamma without a knowledgeable man present -- i.e., a male human being who also knows what is and is not lewd.

Object. The word woman covers women as well: If a bhikkhu is with two or more women, but without a knowledgeable man present, he may teach them no more than five or six sentences of Dhamma. Perception is not a factor here: If a bhikkhu teaches Dhamma to a woman he thinks is a man, this factor is fulfilled as well.

According to the Vibhanga, a female peta, deva, or animal (probably a naga) in the form of a human woman, are each grounds for a dukkata here.

Dhamma the Vibhanga defines in the same terms as under Pacittiya 4: "a saying made by the Buddha, his disciples, seers, or heavenly beings, connected with the teaching, connected with the goal."

Precisely what this means is a point of controversy. The Commentary identifies "sayings made by the Buddha, his disciples, seers, or heavenly beings" with different parts of the Pali Canon -- in Pali -- and then treats "connected with the teaching, connected with the goal" as nouns, the first referring to the Canon, and the second to the ancient commentary named the Maha Atthakatha. This last point is highly unlikely, since the Maha Atthakatha did not yet exist when the Canon was being composed.

There are two alternatives to the Commentary's interpretation: One follows the Commentary in treating "connected with the teaching, connected with the goal" as nouns, but interprets them as meaning any statement dealing with the Dhamma, no matter what language it is in, and regardless of whether or not it is quoted from a text. Thus, according to this interpretation, anything a bhikkhu would say about the Dhamma -- quoted from the Canon, from a later text, or of his own invention -- would count as Dhamma here.

The second interpretation regards "connected with the teaching, connected with the goal" as adjectives modifying "sayings made by the Buddha, his disciples, seers, or heavenly beings." This makes more sense in terms of Pali syntax, but limits the meaning of Dhamma in this rule to passages from the Canon. This would not necessarily limit it to passages in the Pali language, though. Translations from the Canon would also come under the rule, since there is a passage in the Cullavagga (V.33.1) where the Buddha allows bhikkhus to learn Dhamma each in his own language, thus showing, contrary to the Commentary, that Dhamma does not have to be in Pali to be Dhamma.

There is little in the Canon to decide between these two interpretations, and the question comes down to what one perceives to be the purpose of the rule. Adherents of the first interpretation say that the rule is designed to prevent the sort of suspicions that arise when a bhikkhu is talking at length alone with a woman, but this argument does not fit with the Buddha's allowance for a bhikkhu to give a talk when a woman asks him for instruction.

It is more likely that the rule is aimed at preventing a bhikkhu from using his knowledge of Dhamma as a come-on, a way of making himself attractive to a woman. As any man who teaches Dhamma soon learns, there are women who find such knowledge irresistible. To view the rule in this light makes either of the two interpretations tenable, so the wise policy is to adhere to the interpretation of the Community to which one belongs.

This rule applies to telephone conversations as well as to conversations in person, but because the Parivara (I.5.7) notes that it deals only with the spoken word, it does not cover letters or other written communications.

Six sentences. As for the amount of Dhamma a bhikkhu may say to a woman or women without a knowledgeable man present, the Pali word for "sentence," (vaca), can also mean "word," but the Commentary states specifically that one vaca is approximately equal to a line of verse. The Sub-commentary goes on to say that the Commentary's definition here applies to poetry, while one vaca of prose is equal to the conjugation of a verb, i.e., six words. In either case, six vacas would amount to six sentences.

Conversations on other topics. Strangely enough, neither the Vibhanga nor the Commentary makes mention of conversations with women that do not touch on the Dhamma. The Sub-commentary notes this, and in one of its rare stabs at humor concludes, "It is perfectly all right to talk as much as you like about Tamils and that sort of thing."

Conversation that does not deal with the Dhamma, though, is termed "animal talk" (tiracchana-katha) in the Canon, and there are several passages (e.g., Pc. XXI.1; LXXXV.1; Mv.V.6.3-4) that criticize members of the group of six for engaging in animal talk: worldly talk about "kings, robbers, and ministers of state (politics); armies, alarms, and battles; food and drink; clothing, furniture, garlands, and scents; relatives; vehicles; villages, towns, cities, the countryside; women and heroes; the gossip of the street and the well; tales of the dead; also philosophical discussions of the past and future (this is how the Sub-commentary to Pacittiya 85 explains 'tales of diversity'), the creation of the world and of the sea, and talk of whether things exist or not." The Sub-commentary notes, though, that to discuss any of these topics in a way to foster an understanding of the Dhamma -- e.g., discussing the impermanence of worldly power -- is not considered improper.

Although there is no specific penalty for indulging in such worldly talk, a bhikkhu who indulges in it with lay people, bhikkhus or novices to the point where he becomes offensive to the Community may be subject to an act of censure, banishment or suspension on the grounds of "unbecoming association with householders" or "verbal frivolity." Furthermore, a bhikkhu sitting alone with a woman (or women) engaging in such talk would be subject to the conditions of Pacittiya 44 or 45 and Aniyata 1 or 2.

It is also worth noting in this regard that, unlike Pacittiyas 44 & 45 and Aniyatas 1 & 2, this rule covers situations where either the bhikkhu or the woman, or both, are standing. In other words, if a bhikkhu and a woman are conversing while standing, he may teach her at most six sentences of Dhamma unless any of the no-offense clauses apply.

Non-offenses. There is no offense if, after the bhikkhu teaches the woman six sentences of Dhamma, either he or she changes position -- stands up, sits down, etc. -- and he continues with six more sentences. This point was most likely included to indicate separate conversations. Once a bhikkhu has taught five or six sentences to a woman, he may teach her again when they meet again and is not condemned to silence for the rest of his life.

Another exemption is that a bhikkhu, after teaching six sentences of Dhamma to one woman, may turn and teach six more sentences to another without incurring a penalty. Thus the Commentary notes that a bhikkhu addressing an assembly of 100 women may teach them a total of 600 sentences of Dhamma if he aims each set of six at a different woman.

A third exemption is that there is no penalty for a bhikkhu who is teaching Dhamma to someone else, and a woman happens to be listening in.

Finally, as noted above, if a woman asks a bhikkhu a question, a bhikkhu may give her a talk even if no other man is present. This exemption is common to all the rules that deal with instructing women (see Pacittiyas 21 & 22), but precisely what it means is somewhat uncertain, as none of the texts define how teaching Dhamma (dhammam deseti) differs from giving a talk (katheti), if they differ at all. The Commentary notes simply that in giving a talk one is not limited to six sentences; its example of a 'talk' is a recitation of the complete Digha Nikaya (!), which shows that, as far as the commentators are concerned, teaching Dhamma and giving a talk differ only in length. Thus a bhikkhu may answer a woman's question about Dhamma with a talk including as many sentences of Dhamma as he needs to make his point clear.

This allowance is important in that it honors women in their desire to understand the Dhamma. A wise policy, though, would be to show restraint in such situations. The relationship of male teacher to female student has a long, well-known history of getting out of hand. Even if a bhikkhu is in control of himself in such conversations, passers-by -- and the woman herself -- can easily misconstrue his words and actions. So, wherever possible, he should go out of his way to guard himself against suspicion and misunderstandings in such cases by having a man present when talking alone with a woman, even though the special exemption is made.

Summary: Teaching more than six sentences of Dhamma to a woman, except in response to a question, is a pacittiya offense unless a knowledgeable man is present.

8. Should any bhikkhu report (his own) factual superior human state to an unordained person, it is to be confessed.

The factors for the full offense here are three:

1) Object: an unordained person, i.e., anyone -- human or not -- who is not a bhikkhu or bhikkhuni.

2) Effort: One reports one's actual attainment of a superior human state to such a person.

3) Result: The person immediately understands.

Only two of these factors -- effort and result -- require explanation.

Effort. The meaning of superior human state is discussed at length under Parajika 4. In brief, it covers (a) jhana, (b) the cognitive powers that can arise as its result, and (c) the transcendent states.

Factual is not explained in the texts, but probably means factual from the bhikkhu's own point of view. In other words, whether or not he has actually attained a superior human state, if he thinks he has and reports it to an unordained person, he commits an offense all the same. If he actually has attained such a state, e.g., jhana, but thinks he hasn't, and yet claims that he has -- in other words, he is telling what he thinks to be a lie -- he incurs a parajika.

To report, says the Vibhanga, means to speak directly of one's own attainments. To speak indirectly of one's own attainments -- e.g., "The bhikkhu who lives in this dwelling enters jhana at will" -- entails a dukkata. According to the Commentary, gestures fall under this rule as well. Thus, if a lay person asks a bhikkhu who has attained stream-entry if he has reached any of the noble attainments, and the bhikkhu nods, his nod would fulfill the factor of effort here.

The origin story to this rule deals with bhikkhus who, as a tactic for getting almsfood in a time of scarcity, had agreed to speak of one another's superior human states to householders. This would seem to suggest that to speak of another bhikkhu's actual attainment of superior human states with such motives in mind -- e.g., hoping to get a share of the increased gains he might receive -- should entail a penalty as well, but none of the texts mention this point, so it is not an offense. Still, any bhikkhu who plans to act in such a way, on the grounds that whatever is not an offense is perfectly all right, should remember that the Buddha criticized the bhikkhus in the origin story in very strong terms.

Result. As noted above, the bhikkhu incurs the full penalty only if his listener immediately understands what he has said. If the listener does not understand, the bhikkhu incurs a dukkata regardless of whether he spoke directly or indirectly of his attainments.

Whether or not the person addressed believes what is said, is of no account in determining the offense.

Non-offenses. The Vibhanga states that to report one's own superior human attainments to another bhikkhu or to a bhikkhuni carries no penalty. There is, though, a series of stories in the Vinita Vatthu to Parajika 4 that raise a number of points to bear in mind in such situations. A typical example -- the stories differ only in minor details -- is this:

"Then Ven. Maha Moggallana, as he was descending Vulture Peak Mountain, smiled at a certain place. Ven. Lakkhana said to him, 'Friend Moggallana, what is the reason, what is the cause for your smile?'

"'This is not the time, friend Lakkhana, to answer this question. Ask me in the presence of the Blessed One.'

"So Ven. Lakkhana and Ven. Maha Moggallana... having approached and paid homage to the Blessed One, sat to one side. As they were sitting there, Ven. Lakkhana said to Ven. Moggallana, 'Just now, friend Moggallana... you smiled. What was the reason, what was the cause for your smile?'

"'Just now, my friend, I saw a man immersed head and all in a dung pit, eating dung with both hands. The thought occurred to me, "Isn't it amazing, isn't it astounding, that there are beings even like this..."'

"Bhikkhus were offended and annoyed and spread it about, 'Ven. Moggallana is boasting of a superior human state!'

"Then the Blessed One said to the bhikkhus, 'Actually, bhikkhus, there are disciples of vision and knowledge who will know or see or bear witness like this. Once I myself saw that being, but I didn't disclose it. Had I disclosed it, others would not have believed me, and that would have been to their pain and detriment for a long time. That being, bhikkhus, was once a corrupted Brahman right here in Rajagaha. He, in the time of the Buddha Kassapa, having invited a Community of bhikkhus to a meal, having filled a trough with dung and announcing the time, said, "Venerable sirs, eat from this and take with you as much as you like." Having been boiled in purgatory as a result of that deed for many years, many hundreds of years, many thousands of years, many hundreds of thousands of years, he is now -- through the remainder of the result of that deed -- experiencing existence as an individual like this. Moggallana spoke truly, bhikkhus. There is no offense for him.'"

Ven. Moggallana's conduct here -- waiting until he is in the presence of his teacher before relating his vision -- has become a model for conduct among meditators, for as the bhikkhus' reaction and the Buddha's comments make clear, there are situations where the act of relating one's visions, etc., even when allowed, will serve no positive purpose.

Displaying psychic powers. A related rule in the Cullavagga (V.8.2) states that to display psychic powers to lay people is a dukkata. In the origin story leading up to that rule, the Buddha levels strong criticism at such an act: "Just as a woman might expose her sexual organ for a miserable wooden masaka coin, so too have you displayed a superior human state, a wonder of psychic power, to lay people for the sake of a miserable wooden bowl."

To display psychic powers to anyone who is not a lay person, though, is no offense. Thus, given the way these two rules are framed, one may not tell a novice of one's powers, but may levitate before his very eyes.

Summary: To tell an unordained person of one's actual superior human attainments is a pacittiya offense.

9. Should any bhikkhu report (another) bhikkhu's gross offense to an unordained person -- unless authorized by the bhikkhus -- it is to be confessed.

"Now at that time Ven. Upananda the Sakyan was on bad terms with some group-of-six bhikkhus. Having committed an offense of intentional emission of semen, he asked the Community to put him on probation... It so happened that a certain guild in Savatthi was presenting food to the Community. Ven. Upananda, being on probation, sat down on the last seat in the dining hall. The group-of-six bhikkhus said to the lay people, 'Friends, this Ven. Upananda the Sakyan, your esteemed dependent, emitted semen making do with the very same hand with which he is eating your gift of faith...(This is why), being on probation, he is sitting on the last seat.'"

There are two factors for the full offense here:

1) Object: a gross offense committed by another bhikkhu.

2) Effort: One reports it to an unordained person without having been authorized to do so by the Community.

Object. The Vibhanga states that gross offense means any of the four parajika or thirteen sanghadisesa offenses, while Buddhaghosa reports the ancient commentaries as saying that it covers only the sanghadisesas. His discussion of this point is interesting for the light it throws on the history of the texts: He presents two arguments for the commentaries' position, effectively demolishes them, but then backs down and ends up siding with them. Why he does this is hard to say, although it may be that he himself disagreed with the ancient commentaries on this point, but was forced to side with them by the elders of the Mahavihara who were responsible for putting the seal of approval on his work.

At any rate, the details of the argument lie outside the scope of this guide. The Vinaya Mukha has already adopted Buddhaghosa's arguments against the ancient commentaries here, and we will simply follow our usual policy of siding with the Vibhanga wherever the other texts depart from it. Gross offense means both the four parajikas and the thirteen sanghadisesas.

A bhikkhu's non-gross offenses, and an unordained person's misbehavior -- gross or not -- are grounds for a dukkata (%). (The passage on which this last point is based is sometimes translated, "tells one who is not ordained of a transgression" when it should read, "tells of an unordained person's transgression.") According to the Commentary, gross misbehavior on the part of an unordained person means breaking any of the five precepts. Anything else would count as not gross.

This dukkata penalty for informing an unordained person about another unordained person's transgressions of the precepts is a point frequently overlooked in discussions of this rule, but it is important. It seems to be aimed at keeping bhikkhus from being gossips, so that novices and lay people may seek advice from a bhikkhu concerning the difficulties they have in observing the precepts without fear that the bhikkhu will spread it about to other unordained people as well.

This also helps preserve the good faith of donors: They can give their support to the bhikkhus without fear that the recipients of their support might be gossiping about their lapses in the practice behind their backs. If donors were to learn that a bhikkhu had been gossiping about them, they might become so disgusted as to withdraw their support from the religion as a whole.

Effort. Unordained person here means anyone who is not a bhikkhu or a bhikkhuni.

To report an offense to an unordained person means to tell him/her both the action and the class of the offense. Thus, to say, "Ven. Upananda committed a sanghadisesa by masturbating," would fulfill the fact of effort here; while to say simply, "Ven. Upananda committed a sanghadisesa." or "Ven. Upananda masturbated," would not, and would not even be grounds for a lesser offense.

This allowance, which looks strange on the surface, was made apparently for such cases as when a lay person, seeing a senior bhikkhu sitting at the end of the line, might ask one of the other bhikkhus why. A bhikkhu would be well-advised, though, to examine his motives before making use of this allowance, for to take advantage of it to discredit a fellow bhikkhu would be to incur a dukkata under Pacittiya 13. Though the penalty is minor, little acts and minor offenses of this sort are often the ones most destructive to the harmony of the Community.

The authorization. The Vibhanga does not give any indication of when the Community should authorize a bhikkhu to tell unordained people about another bhikkhu's gross offense. As the Vinaya Mukha sees it, the purpose of the training rule is to prevent bhikkhus from advertising one another's faults among people outside the Community. However, there are cases, it says, where a bhikkhu may commit a gross offense and refuse to acknowledge it, as when committing a parajika and yet continuing to assume the status of a bhikkhu, or committing a sanghadisesa and refusing to go through the procedures for rehabilitation. Thus the Community in such cases is allowed to authorize one of its members to inform lay people, such as the bhikkhu's supporters, as a way of exerting pressure on him to submit to his penalty.

According to the Commentary, though, the authorization is to be used in cases where the Community feels that the act of informing the laity would help to convince a well-intentioned but weak-willed bhikkhu who repeatedly commits sanghadisesa offenses -- even if he willingly undergoes the period of penance -- to mend his ways.

Both interpretations fit with the Canon, although it should be borne in mind that using the authorization in line with the Vinaya Mukha's rationale -- to exert pressure on a bhikkhu who refuses to undergo a penalty -- can often backfire, for the laity may simply think that the Community is jealous of the support they are giving to the bhikkhu they assume to be innocent of any wrong-doing.

The Vibhanga also does not tell how the authorization is to be issued. According to the Commentary, it is to be made as a declaration (apalokana) stated three times and unanimously agreed to by the Community meeting within a proper boundary for formal acts.

The Vibhanga does state, though, that when giving the authorization, the Community may make it limited to families, limited to offenses, limited to both or to neither. Limited to families means that the bhikkhu receiving the authorization may inform only certain specified families. Limited to offenses means that he may report only certain of the guilty bhikkhu's offenses. A bhikkhu who oversteps the limits of his authorization incurs a pacittiya.

Non-offenses. We have already covered the cases that the Vibhanga includes in the no-offenses clauses. To recapitulate: There is no penalty --

1) in telling an unordained person about another bhikkhu's serious offense if one states the action but not the class of offense, or the class but not the action; or

2) in reporting another bhikkhu's serious offense -- action and class of offense -- to an unordained person when one has been properly authorized to do so, as long as one does not overstep the bounds of one's authorization.

Summary: Telling an unordained person of another bhikkhu's serious offense -- unless one is authorized by the Community to do so -- is a pacittiya offense.

10. Should any bhikkhu dig soil or have it dug, it is to be confessed.

This is an offense with four factors: object, effort, perception, and intention.

Object. The Pali word for soil, pathavi, also means ground or earth. Thus the Vibhanga distinguishes what forms of earth are and are not classed as soil:

Pure loam, pure clay, whatever is mostly loam or clay with a lesser portion of rock, stones, potsherds, gravel, or sand mixed in, is classed as soil (jata-pathavi).

Whatever is pure rock, stones, potsherds, gravel, or sand, or any of these with a lesser portion of loam or clay mixed in, is earth not classed as soil (ajata-pathavi). Also, burnt clay or loam -- according to the Commentary, this means soil that has been burnt in the course of firing a bowl, pot, etc. -- is not classed as soil. As for heaps of loam or clay that have been dug up: If they have been rained on for less than four months, they are not classed as soil, but if rained on for four months or more, they are. Also, the layer of fine dust that forms on the surface of dry soil as the result of wind erosion is not classed as soil.

As the Commentary makes clear in discussing the Vibhanga's no-offense clauses, there is no penalty in digging earth not classed as soil. Thus, for example, digging into a pile of newly dug-up loam or drawing diagrams in the dust on top of dry soil would not be an offense.

Effort. The Vibhanga says that the term digging also covers burning, i.e., firing pottery; and breaking, i.e., making a furrow with a rake or a stick. Thus, using a stick to draw in the soil or driving in a stake or pulling one out in such a way as to disturb the surrounding soil would fulfill the factor of effort here.

Non-offenses. Because perception and intention are mitigating factors here, there is no offense for the bhikkhu who digs soil --

unknowingly -- e.g., digging into a pile of soil perceiving it to be sand;

unthinkingly -- e.g., absent-mindedly drawing in the dirt while talking with someone else; or

unintentionally -- e.g., raking leaves, pulling a wheelbarrow through the mud, or digging in a pile of sand and accidentally digging into the soil underneath.

Also, there is no offense in asking for clay or soil, or in indicating a need for a hole in the ground, without expressly giving the command to dig. ("Please get me some clay to make a pot." "We're going to need a hole right here.") According to the Commentary, an explicit request that a reservoir or pit, etc., be dug also entails no penalty as long as one does not say precisely where to dig it. ("We're going to have to drain the water from A to B, so dig the trench wherever you think it would do the job best.") This sort of request or hint is termed kappiya-vohara -- "allowable expression," or in plain English, "wording it right" -- and often finds use in the context of rules where an express command would be an offense but an indication of a desire or intent would not.

The Commentary quotes the ancient commentaries as saying that if another person or animal has fallen into a pit, there is no penalty for digging the victim out. The same holds true if another person or animal is trapped by a fallen but still-living tree: The bhikkhu may cut the tree to free the victim without incurring a penalty under the following rule.

Although the Commentary cannot find any justification in the Canon for these opinions, it states that they should be accepted since they are the unanimous judgment of the ancient commentaries. As we have noted before, Buddhaghosa does not always accept even the unanimous judgment of the ancient commentaries, but perhaps he felt that these were cases in which it would be better to err on the side of compassion rather than the side of strictness.

However, the Commentary goes on to say that if a bhikkhu falls into a pit himself, he should not dig any earth that would be classed as soil, even for the sake of his life. The same holds true if he is trapped by a fallen but still-living tree: He may not cut the tree even though his life is in danger.

The reason for this rule, as indicated by the origin story, is that people in general at the time of the Buddha viewed soil as having a form of one-facultied life. The Jains, who were contemporaries of the Buddha, classed life into five categories according to the number of senses or faculties the living thing possessed. In the one-facultied category, where there is only the sense of touch, they included soil and vegetation. One scholar has suggested that the Jains here were simply systematizing an animist belief, predating their theories, that soil and plants had souls. At any rate, this sort of view was so widespread at the time that any potters who were meticulous in their precepts would take their clay only from termite nests and other piles of dug-up earth. The Ghatikara Sutta (M.81) describes a potter -- a nonreturner in the dispensation of the Buddha Kassapa -- who even though he was a lay man would take the earth for his pots only from collapsed embankments and the piles of dirt around rat holes so as to avoid injuring the soil.

Another consideration, carrying more weight at present, is that the act of digging soil risks killing or injuring whatever animals may be living there.

This rule, together with the following one, also effectively prevents bhikkhus from engaging in agriculture.

Summary: Digging soil or commanding that it be dug is a pacittiya offense.