61. Should any bhikkhu knowingly deprive an animal of life, it is to be confessed.

There are five factors for the full offense here.

1) Object: a living animal.

2) Perception: One perceives it to be a living animal.

3) Intention: One knowingly, consciously, deliberately, and purposefully wants to cause its death.

4) Effort: whatever one does with the purpose of causing it to die.

5) Result: It dies as a result of one's action.

Object. Animal here covers all common animals. As the Commentary notes, whether the animal is large or small makes no difference in terms of the penalty, although the size of the animal is one of the factors determining the moral gravity of the act.

Apparently, this factor does not include beings too small to be seen with the naked eye, inasmuch as the classes of medicine allowed in Mahavagga VI include a number of anti-bacterial and anti-viral substances -- some mineral salts and the decoctions made from the leaves of some trees, for example, can be antibiotic. The Commentary's example of the smallest extreme to which this rule extends is a bed bug egg. The four "Things Not To Be Done," taught to every bhikkhu immediately after his ordination (Mv.I.78.4), say that one should not deprive an animal of life, "even if it is only an ant."

On the other end of the spectrum, there is a parajika for deliberately killing a human being, and a thullaccaya for deliberately killing a peta, yakkha, or naga.

Perception. If this factor is not fulfilled, there is no offense. For example, if one steps on bed bug eggs, thinking them to be spots of dirt, there is no penalty.

Intention, in the Vibhanga, is described as "having made the decision knowingly, consciously, and purposefully." According to the Commentary, "having made the decision" refers to the moment when one "crushes" one's indecisiveness by taking an act. Knowingly means that one knows that, "This is a living being." Consciously means that one is aware that one's action is depriving the animal of life. Purposefully means that one's purpose in acting is to kill the animal.

All of this indicates that this factor is fulfilled only when one acts on a clear and consciously made decision to deprive the animal of life. Thus, for example, if one is sweeping a walk, trying carefully not to kill any insects, and yet some ants happen to die, one does not commit an offense even if one knew that there was the possibility that some might die, since one's purpose in acting was not to cause their death.

Effort. The act of taking life may take the form of any of the six types of action listed under Parajika 3:

using one's own person (e.g., hitting with the hand, kicking, using a knife or a club);
throwing (hurling a stone, shooting an arrow or a gun);
using a stationary device (setting a trap, placing poison in food);
using magical formulae;
using psychic powers;
commanding.

A passage in the Mahavagga (V.10.10) deals with a case of this last instance, in which a depraved bhikkhu tells a layman that he has use for a certain calf's hide, and the layman kills the calf for him. Since the bhikkhu did not give a specific command that the calf be killed, and yet the Buddha said that his action did come under this rule, this shows that there is no room for kappiya-vohara in this context. Whatever one says in hopes of inciting someone else to kill an animal would fulfill this factor.

Result. Only if the animal dies does one incur the pacittiya here. The Commentary to Pacittiya 74 imposes a dukkata on the simple act of striking an animal.

Non-offenses. There is no offense in killing an animal --

unintentionally -- e.g., accidentally dropping a load that crushes a cat to death;

unthinkingly -- e.g., absent-mindedly rubbing one's arm while it is being bitten by mosquitoes;

unknowingly -- e.g., walking into a dark room and, without realizing it, stepping on an insect; or

when one's action is motivated by a purpose other than that of causing death -- e.g., giving medicine to a sick dog whose system, it turns out, cannot withstand the dosage.

Still, the Commentary states that if one notices even bed bug eggs while cleaning a bed, one should be careful not to damage them. Thus, "out of compassion, one's duties are to be done carefully." Or, in the words of the Sub-commentary: "One's duties in looking after one's dwelling are to be done with mindfulness well-established so that such creatures do not die."

Summary: Deliberately killing an animal -- or having it killed -- is a pacittiya offense.

62. Should any bhikkhu knowingly make use of water with living beings in it, it is to be confessed.

This rule is similar to Pacittiya 20, differing only in the factor of effort and the way the non-offenses are defined. Here, as under that rule, the factors for the full offense are four:

Object: water containing living creatures. This includes things like mosquito larvae, but not beings too small to be seen.

Perception. One knows that they are there (from having seen them or heard that they are there, says the K/Commentary), and that they will die from the factor of effort, defined below.

If one is in doubt as to whether water contains living beings, then to use it in a way that would cause their death if they were there is to incur a dukkata.

Effort. The Vibhanga does not go into detail on this factor, while the Commentary defines it with examples: drinking the water, using it to wash one's bowl, using it to cool hot porridge, dipping it out of a tank or pond to bathe with it, making waves in a pool so that the water will splash over its banks. The Sub-commentary suggests that this rule covers only cases in which one is using water for one's own personal consumption, but this does not fit with the fact that, under this rule, the Commentary explains how one should go about cleaning out a dirty pool. (Place eight to ten potfuls of water containing no living beings in another place that will hold the water, and then dip the water from the pool into it.)

From all of this, it would appear that this rule covers all cases of using water containing living beings that are not covered by Pacittiya 20.

Unlike that rule, though, the factor of effort here does not cover cases of telling someone else to use water containing living beings.

Intention. This factor is fulfilled simply by the desire to use the water As the K/Commentary notes, one need not have murderous intent toward the living beings in order to fulfill this factor. For example, if after perceiving that the water contains insects, one chooses to ignore their existence and boils the water -- not to kill the insects, but to use the water for bathing -- one commits an offense all the same.

"Result" is not a factor here. Whether or not the living beings actually die is of no consequence in determining the offense.

Non-offenses. There is no offense in using water --

if one does not know that it contains living beings;
if one knows that it does not contain living beings; or
if one knows that the living beings it contains will not die from the use one has in mind.

Water strainers. Cv.V.13.1 gives permission for one to use a water strainer to remove dirt and living beings from water before using it, and such strainers eventually became one of a bhikkhu's eight basic requisites. According to Cv.V.13.2, one must take a water strainer along when going on a journey. If one has no strainer, one may determine the corner of one's outer robe as a strainer and use it to filter water.

Summary: Using water, knowing that it contains living beings that will die from one's use, is a pacittiya offense.

63. Should any bhikkhu knowingly agitate for the reviving of an issue that has been rightfully dealt with, it is to be confessed.

Issues. An issue (adhikarana) is a matter that, once arisen, must be dealt with formally in a prescribed manner. The Vibhanga lists four sorts:

1) disputes concerning Dhamma and Vinaya (see Sanghadisesa 10), which the Community must deal with by declaring which side is right and which wrong;

2) accusations concerning offenses (see Sanghadisesas 8 & 9; Aniyatas 1 & 2), which the Community must deal with by judging them true or false;

3) the commission of offenses, which are to be dealt with by the offenders' undergoing the prescribed penalties; and

4) duties of the Community -- such as giving ordination and holding the Patimokkha recitation -- which the Community must deal with by performing them fully.

An issue rightfully dealt with is one that has been handled fairly in accordance with the procedures given in the Vinaya. Some of these procedures are discussed under Pacittiyas 79 & 80, and the Adhikarana-Samatha rules. If an issue has been dealt with improperly, it may be reopened for reconsideration, but once it has been dealt with properly it is considered closed for good.

The factors for an offense under this rule are three.

1) Object: an issue that has been dealt with properly.

2) Perception: One knows that it was dealt with properly, either because one was directly involved or one has been told of the matter.

3) Effort: One says -- in the presence of another bhikkhu -- that it was dealt with improperly. The Vibhanga gives the following examples of statements that would fulfill this factor: "The issue was not carried out." "It was poorly carried out." "It should be carried out again." "It was not settled." "It was poorly settled." "It should be settled again."

The Parivara (IX.3) contains a short discussion of this rule, and makes the point that one is subject to this rule regardless of whether or not one was involved in dealing with the issue the first time around.

Further action. If one makes a concerted effort to reopen an issue, knowing that it was properly dealt with, one is considered a maker of strife, and as such is subject to an act of censure, banishment, or suspension, depending on the gravity of the case.

Non-offenses. There is no offense in agitating to have an issue re-opened if one perceives it to have been improperly dealt with: e.g., dealt with not in accordance with the rules and procedures of the Vinaya, dealt with by an incomplete group, or -- in the case of an accusation or similar acts -- performed against someone who did not deserve it. This allowance holds regardless of whether, in actuality, the issue was properly dealt with or not. For example: A Community has performed an act of censure against Bhikkhu X. One honestly believes that X did not deserve the act, and says so to a fellow bhikkhu. In this case, one commits no offense, even if it turns out that X did in fact deserve censure.

Summary: Agitating to re-open an issue, knowing that it was properly dealt with, is a pacittiya offense.

64. Should any bhikkhu knowingly conceal another bhikkhu's serious offense, it is to be confessed.

Here there are four factors for the full offense.

1) Object: Another bhikkhu has committed a serious offense, which according to the Vibhanga means a parajika or a sanghadisesa.

2) Perception: One knows that he has committed a serious offense.

3) Intention: One wants to hide the offense from other bhikkhus, for fear that they will reprove or remind him of the offense (steps in the formal inquiry into the offense) or that they will jeer, scoff, or shame him about it (steps in his enemies' informal reaction to the news). In other words, this factor is fulfilled if one wants to prevent a formal act from being carried out against the offender or simply to protect him from the jeering remarks of other bhikkhus who may dislike him.

4) Effort: A bhikkhu who may be told of the matter is available, but one abandons one's duty to tell him.

Object & perception. Another bhikkhu's non-serious offenses are grounds for a dukkata here, as are the misdeeds -- serious or non-serious -- of an unordained person (i.e., a novice).

As for a bhikkhu's offenses, only a serious offense that one perceives to be serious is grounds for a pacittiya; all other possible combinations of object and perception -- a serious offense that one perceives to be non-serious, a non-serious offense that one perceives to be serious, and a non-serious offense that one perceives to be non-serious -- are grounds for a dukkata.

Effort. The K/Commentary defines this factor as if it were a simple act of mind -- one decides that, "I won't tell any bhikkhu about this" -- but this goes against the basic principles of the Vinaya, in which a mere act of mind is never sufficient for an offense. It would seem better to argue from the Vibhanga and say that this factor is fulfilled if one comes to this decision when another bhikkhu is available.

The Commentary says that if one abandons one's responsibility, but then later changes one's mind and tells another bhikkhu, one has committed the offense all the same.

It also says that if one tells Bhikkhu X, asking him to help hide Bhikkhu Y's offense, this also fulfills the factor of effort here. If X then abandons his responsibility to tell, he too commits the offense under this rule.

Non-offenses. There is no offense in not telling another bhikkhu --

if one thinks that telling will lead to strife or a split in the Community;
if one fears reprisals from the bhikkhu who has committed the offense;
if there is no suitable bhikkhu to tell;
if one is not trying to hide the offense; or
if one feels that the wrong-doer's own behavior will betray him and thus there is no need to tell.

Summary: Not informing other bhikkhus of a serious offense that one knows another bhikkhu has committed -- out of a desire to protect him either from having to undergo the penalty or from the jeering remarks of other bhikkhus -- is a pacittiya offense.

65. Should any bhikkhu knowingly give full ordination to an individual less than twenty years of age, the individual is not ordained and the bhikkhus are blameworthy; and as for him (the preceptor), it is to be confessed.

The origin story here tells how the group of 17 came to be ordained.

"Now at that time in Rajagaha, a group of 17 boys were friends, with the boy Upali as their leader. Then the thought occurred to Upali's parents, 'By what means could Upali, after our death, live pleasantly and not grow weary (with work)?... If he studies writing, his fingers will hurt... If he studies calculation, his breast will hurt... If he studies money changing, his eyes will hurt. Now, these Sakyan contemplatives are of pleasing virtue and conduct. Having eaten fine meals, they lie down in beds sheltered from the wind. If Upali went forth among the Sakyan contemplatives, he would live pleasantly after our death and not be weary with work.'

"The boy Upali heard his parents' conversation. Then he went to the boys... and said, 'Come, masters, let's go forth among the Sakyan contemplatives.'

"'If you go forth, master, so will we.'

"So each of the boys, having approached his parents, said, 'Permit us to go forth from home into homelessness.' Then the parents of the boys gave their permission, (thinking,) 'All these boys are unanimous. They want what is noble.'

"(The boys) having approached the bhikkhus, asked for the going forth. The bhikkhus gave them the going forth and full ordination. Then, waking up in the last watch of the night, the boys (now bhikkhus) cried out, 'Give us porridge! Give us rice! Give us food!'

"The bhikkhus said, 'Wait, friends, until it turns light. If there is porridge, you will drink it. If there is rice, you will eat it. If there is food, you will eat it. But if there is no porridge or rice or food, then you will eat having gone for alms.'

"But even then, those (new) bhikkhus cried out as before, 'Give us porridge! Give us rice! Give us food!' And they wet the bedding and soiled it."

The Buddha, in rebuking the bhikkhus who had given full ordination to the 17 boys, painted a picture of the bhikkhus' life very different from that imagined by Upali's parents:

"Bhikkhus, how can these worthless men knowingly give full ordination to an individual less than 20 years old? An individual less than 20 years old is not resistant to cold, heat, hunger, thirst, the touch of gadflies and mosquitoes, wind and sun and creeping things; or to abusive, hurtful language. He is not the sort that can endure bodily feelings that, when they arise, are painful, sharp, stabbing, fierce, distasteful, disagreeable, deadly.'"

The factors for the full offense here are three.

1) Object: a man less than 20 years old.

2) Perception: One knows that he is less than 20 years old.

3) Effort: One acts as the preceptor in his full ordination as a bhikkhu.

Object. As Mv.I.75 makes clear, a person's age for the purpose of this rule is counted from the time of his conception in his mother's womb. Since this is difficult -- if not impossible -- to date with any accuracy, the usual practice in calculating a person's age is to add six months to the number of years since his birth, to allow for the possibility of his having been born prematurely. As the Commentary notes, a baby born after seven months in the womb may survive, but one born after only six months in the womb won't.

Perception. If one does not know that the individual is less than 20 years old, there is no offense in ordaining him. If one is in doubt as to whether or not he is less than 20, but goes ahead and ordains him anyway, one incurs a dukkata regardless of his actual age.

Effort. There is a dukkata for every step in arranging the ordination of an individual one knows to be less than 20 years old, beginning with the act of searching out a group to ordain him, looking for robes and a bowl for him to use, etc., all the way to the second announcement in the formal act of ordination. Once the third and final announcement has been made, the preceptor incurs a pacittiya, and all other bhikkhus in the group who know that the individual is less than 20 years old, a dukkata.

In any case, if the individual is really less than 20 years old when he is ordained, then -- regardless of whether or not he or anyone else knows of the fact -- he does not count as a bhikkhu and is only novice. The Commentary notes here that if he continues in this state for long enough to become a preceptor or teacher in another person's ordination, that person counts as rightly ordained only as long as there are enough true bhikkhus in the group ordaining him, not counting the improperly ordained "bhikkhu" in question.

It adds that if one is less that 20 when being ordained, without knowing the fact, it does not act as an obstacle to one's qualifying for heaven or the transcendent states; but if one ever finds out the truth that one was improperly ordained, one should immediately arrange for a proper ordination.

Summary: Acting as the preceptor in the ordination of a person one knows to be less than 20 years old is a pacittiya offense.

66. Should any bhikkhu knowingly and by arrangement travel together with a caravan of thieves, even for the interval between one village and the next, it is to be confessed.

Here the full offense has three factors:

1) Object: a caravan of thieves.

2) Perception: One knows that it is a caravan of thieves.

3) Effort: (a) One makes an arrangement together with the caravan to travel together and (b) one actually travels together with them as arranged (c) from one village to another.

Object. A caravan of thieves, according to the Vibhanga, is any group that has committed a theft, is on its way to commit a theft, is planning to evade a tax, or is planning to "rob the king," which the Commentary translates as planning to cheat the government in one way or another. At present this would include any person or group of people smuggling or trading in contraband goods.

None of the texts mention the minimum number of thieves needed to form a "group," but arguing from the Great Standards we can say that even a single thief would fulfill this factor.

Perception. If one does not know that a person or group would count as a caravan of thieves, there is no offense in traveling by arrangement with them. If one is in doubt, then there is a dukkata for traveling with them regardless of whether they actually are a caravan of thieves or not.

Making an arrangement. According to the Vibhanga, the bhikkhu must give his verbal consent to the arrangement for this part of the factor to be fulfilled. In other words, if the thieves propose the arrangement, and he agrees; or he proposes it, regardless of whether or not they agree, this part of the factor is fulfilled. The penalty for fulfilling it is a dukkata.

If the thieves propose the arrangement, while the bhikkhu does not give his verbal assent, then even if he does travel together as they proposed, he commits no offense in doing so.

Going as arranged. If a specific time frame was part of the arrangement, then the two parties must begin traveling together within that time frame for this factor to be fulfilled. If they happen to start out earlier or later than arranged, the bhikkhu incurs no penalty. The Commentary notes, though, that if they leave from a different spot than the one they had arranged or go by a different route, that does not absolve the bhikkhu from the offense

From one village to another. There is a pacittiya for every village-to-village interval one passes. In an area where there are no villages -- i.e., says the Sub-commentary, where villages are farther than half a league (8 km. or 5 miles) apart -- there is a pacittiya for every half-league one travels together as arranged.

None of the texts mention cases of traveling long distances within a large city, but it would seem that in such cases -- arguing from the Great Standards -- one would incur the full penalty in traveling from one administrative district to the next.

Non-offenses. There is no offense --

if the bhikkhu and thieves happen to travel together without having made an arrangement;

if the thieves propose an arrangement, while the bhikkhu does not give his verbal assent;

if they leave together at a time other than that they had previously arranged; or

if there are dangers (and the bhikkhu must join the caravan for his safety).

Summary: Traveling by arrangement with a group of thieves from one village to another -- knowing that they are thieves -- is a pacittiya offense.

67. Should any bhikkhu, by arrangement, travel together with a woman, even for the interval between one village and the next, it is to be confessed.

"Now at that time a certain bhikkhu, going through the Kosalan countryside on his way to Savatthi, passed by the gate of a certain village. A certain woman, leaving the village after quarreling with her husband, saw the bhikkhu and said, 'Where are you going, sir?'

"'I'm going to Savatthi, sister.'

"'Then I'm going with you.'

"'As you wish, sister.'

"Then the woman's husband, leaving the village, asked people, 'Have you seen such-and-such a woman?'

"'She's going along with a monk.'

"So the man, having caught up with them, seized the bhikkhu, gave him a good thrashing, and set him free. The bhikkhu went and sat fuming under a certain tree. The woman said to the man, 'That bhikkhu didn't abscond with me. I was the one who went with him. He's innocent. Go and ask his forgiveness.'

"So the man asked the bhikkhu for his forgiveness."

Object. A female human being, mature enough to know what is and is not lewd, is grounds for a pacittiya here. Pandakas (see Sanghadisesa 2), female yakkhas and petas, and animals in the form of a female human being are all grounds for a dukkata.

Perception is not a mitigating factor here. Thus if one travels by arrangement with a woman disguised as a man, one still incurs the full penalty. Similarly, if one travels by arrangement with a pandaka, not knowing that that's what he is, one still incurs a dukkata.

Effort here is defined as under the preceding rule: (a) One makes an arrangement together with the woman to travel together and (b) one actually travels together with her as arranged (c) from one village to another. See the preceding rule for explanations.

Non-offenses. There is no offense --

if the bhikkhu and woman happen to travel together without having made an arrangement;
if the woman proposes an arrangement, while the bhikkhu does not give his verbal assent;
if they leave together at a time other than that they had previously arranged; or
if there are dangers.

Current practice. In the time of the Buddha, long-distance travel was mostly by foot, and the question of prior arrangement was what made the difference between whether one was traveling together with someone else or simply happened to be walking along the road at the same time. At present, when one is taking public transport -- buses, subways, trains, and airplanes -- this is still the factor determining whether one is traveling together with someone else or simply happens to be on the bus, etc., at the same time. This rule thus forbids a bhikkhu from traveling together with a woman, by prior arrangement, on the same public transport.

Private transport, though -- such as automobiles, trucks and vans -- is an area that different Communities treat in differing ways. Some treat it under Pacittiya 44, rather than here, and say that a bhikkhu may sit in an automobile with a woman as long as a knowledgeable man is present. This holds regardless of whether the automobile is sitting still or traveling any number of miles, and regardless of whether the woman or the man is driving.

Other Communities treat private transport under this rule, but say that the prior arrangement is implicitly with the driver of the transport. If the driver is a woman, there is a pacittiya in riding with her from one village to the next. If the driver is a man, there is no offense, regardless of whether or not a woman is riding along.

The Commentary would not agree with this second interpretation, for it states explicitly when discussing Mv.V.10.3 that a bhikkhu may ride in a cart driven by a woman or a man. At any rate, though, this is another area where the wise policy is to follow the practice of the Community in which one belongs, as long as one is careful to adhere to the Vibhanga by not entering verbally into any arrangement with a woman to go traveling together.

Summary: Traveling by arrangement with a woman from one village to another is a pacittiya offense.

68. Should any bhikkhu say the following: "As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, those acts the Blessed One says are obstructive, when indulged in are not genuine obstructions," the bhikkhus should admonish him thus: "Do not say that, venerable sir. Do not misrepresent the Blessed One, for it is not good to misrepresent the Blessed One. The Blessed One would not say anything like that. In many ways, friend, the Blessed One has described obstructive acts, and when indulged in they are genuine obstructions."

And should the bhikkhu, thus admonished by the bhikkhus, persist as before, the bhikkhus are to rebuke him up to three times so as to desist. If while being rebuked up to three times he desists, that is good. If he does not desist, it is to be confessed.

Obstructions. An obstruction, the Commentary says, is anything that acts as an obstacle to the attainment of heaven or emancipation. It lists five major types:

1) Acts, i.e., the five anantariya kamma: patricide, matricide, the murder of an arahant, the wounding of a Buddha, the creation of a schism in a Sangha;

2) Defilements, i.e., firmly held wrong views (the Sub-commentary lists determinism, fatalism, annihilationism, etc.);

3) Fruits of past actions, e.g., birth as a neuter person, a hermaphrodite, a common animal;

4) Disputes, i.e., disputes with Noble Ones -- even simple contentiousness in the mind, says the Sub-commentary -- although these are obstructions only so long as one has not asked forgiveness; and finally, for a bhikkhu,

5) Intentional transgressions of the Buddha's ordinances, although these are obstacles only as long as one has not undergone the penalty called for in the relevant rule.

The Commentary notes that this training rule deals with a bhikkhu who holds to the view that this last category is not an obstacle, the most common example being the bhikkhu who believes that there is nothing wrong in a bhikkhu's having sexual intercourse in defiance of Parajika 1.

There are many ways that one might rationalize such an idea, and the Commentary gives an entertaining description of one of them:

"Here a bhikkhu... having gone into seclusion, reasons as follows: 'There are people living the household life, enjoying the five pleasures of the senses, who are stream-winners, once-returners, and nonreturners. As for bhikkhus, they see pleasurable forms cognizable via the eye, hear... smell... taste... feel (pleasurable) tactile sensations cognizable via the body. They use soft carpets and clothing. All this is proper. Then why shouldn't the sight, sound, smell, taste, and feel of a woman be proper? They too are proper!' Thus... comparing a mustard seed with Mount Sineru, he gives rise to the pernicious view, 'Why did the Blessed One -- binding the ocean, as it were, with great effort -- formulate the first parajika training rule? There is nothing wrong with that act.'"

Simply holding such a view is not enough to bring a bhikkhu under the purview of this rule, but if he asserts it to others, other bhikkhus have the duty of reprimanding him up to three times in the manner described in the rule. If, having learned of his assertion, one does not reprimand him, one incurs a dukkata, for if he goes unreprimanded, he may continue with his assertions as he likes without incurring a penalty.

If, after being reprimanded, he abandons his view, he incurs no penalty. But if he doesn't, he should then be taken into the midst of the Community to be admonished and rebuked as described under Sanghadisesa 10, the only difference here being that the penalty is a dukkata in each of the preliminary stages, and a pacittiya after the third formal rebuke.

Perception is not a mitigating factor here. If the act of admonishment and rebuke is properly carried out, then his offense is a pacittiya regardless of whether or not he regards it as such. If the act is improperly carried out, then again -- regardless of how he perceives the validity of the act -- he incurs a dukkata (%).

Further action. If a bhikkhu penalized under this rule persists in asserting his wrong view, he is subject to an act of suspension, under which he is not allowed to consort or have communion with bhikkhus in any Community until he sees the error of his ways and abandons his view.

Non-offenses. There is no offense for the bhikkhu if he has not been reprimanded or if, after being reprimanded, he abandons his view.

Summary: Refusing -- after the third announcement of a formal rebuke in a meeting of the Community -- to give up the wrong view that there is nothing wrong in intentionally transgressing the Buddha's ordinances is a pacittiya offense.

69. Should any bhikkhu knowingly consort, join in communion, or lie down in the same lodging with a bhikkhu professing such a view who has not acted in compliance with the rule, who has not abandoned that view, it is to be confessed.

There are three factors for the full offense here.

1) Object: a bhikkhu who has been suspended by a formal act of the Community and has not yet been restored.

2) Perception: One knows that he has been suspended and has not yet been restored.

3) Effort: One consorts with him, joins in communion with him, or lies down in the same lodging with him.

Object. According to Cv.I.25-35, a bhikkhu may be suspended for any one of three reasons:

He holds to wrong views, as in the preceding rule;

he refuses to see an offense (i.e., he admits to having performed an act forbidden by the rules, but refuses to concede that it is an offense); or

he refuses to undergo the penalty for an offense he admits to having committed.

Once a bhikkhu has been suspended, it is his duty to change his ways and reject the view or position that led to his suspension, so that he may be restored to normal status.

As the Commentary makes clear, the factor of object here is fulfilled by a bhikkhu who has been suspended for any of these three reasons and has yet to be restored. The Vibhanga's no-offense clauses, though, add that if the bhikkhu was suspended for holding a wrong view and has come to abandon that view, he does not fulfill this factor even if the Community has yet to restore him to normal status.

Perception. There is no offense in consorting, etc., with a suspended bhikkhu if one does not know that he has been suspended; and a dukkata for consorting, etc., with a bhikkhu if one is in doubt as to whether he has been suspended. This last penalty holds regardless of whether he has actually been suspended or not.

Effort here covers any one of three sorts of action:

1) One consorts with the bhikkhu. Consorting takes one of two forms: sharing material objects, i.e., giving material objects to the bhikkhu or receiving them from him; or sharing Dhamma, i.e., reciting Dhamma for him or getting him to recite Dhamma. The penalties for sharing Dhamma are, if one recites line-by-line or gets the other to recite line-by-line, a pacittiya for each line of Dhamma recited; if one recites syllable-by-syllable or gets him to recite syllable-by-syllable, a pacittiya for each syllable.

2) One joins in communion with the bhikkhu, i.e., one performs a formal act of the Community in which he takes a part. An example would be sitting in the same assembly with him to listen to the Patimokkha.

3) One lies down in the same lodging with him. "Same lodging" here, unlike Pacittiyas 5 & 6, means one with the same roof. Thus, as the K/Commentary notes, if one is lying under the same roof with the bhikkhu, one falls under this factor even if one is lying in a room that is not connected by any entrance with the one he is lying in. And, we might add, one falls under this factor regardless of whether the lodging is walled or not. Whether one lies down first, the suspended bhikkhu lies down first, or both lie down at the same time, is not an issue here.

These three actions touch on only a few of the observances a suspended bhikkhu must follow, but they are the only ones that entail a pacittiya for the bhikkhu who has dealings with him while he is suspended. For further details, see Cv.I.25-35.

Non-offenses. There is no offense in consorting, joining in communion, or lying down in the same lodging with another bhikkhu if one perceives that --

he has not been suspended;
he was suspended but has been restored; or
he has abandoned the wrong view that led to his suspension.

These exemptions hold regardless of whether or not one's perception is correct.

Summary: Consorting, joining in communion, or lying down under the same roof with a bhikkhu who has been suspended and not been restored -- knowing that such is the case -- is a pacittiya offense.

70. And if a novice should say the following: "As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, those acts the Blessed One says are obstructive when indulged in, are not genuine obstructions," the bhikkhus should admonish him thus: "Do not say that, friend novice. Do not misrepresent the Blessed One, for it is not good to misrepresent the Blessed One. The Blessed One would not say anything like that. In many ways, friend, the Blessed One has described obstructive acts, and when indulged in they are genuine obstructions."

And should that novice, thus admonished by the bhikkhus, persist as before, the bhikkhus should admonish him as follows: "From this day forth, friend novice, you are not to claim the Blessed One as your teacher, nor are you even to have the opportunity the other novices get -- that of sharing lodgings two or three nights with the bhikkhus. Away with you! Out of our sight! (literally, 'Get lost!')"

Should any bhikkhu knowingly support, receive services from, consort with, or lie down in the same lodging with a novice thus expelled, it is to be confessed.

The factors for the full offense here are three.

1) Object: a novice who has been expelled and has not given up his wrong view.

2) Perception: One knows that he has been expelled and has not given up his wrong view.

3) Effort: One supports him, receives services from him, consorts with him, or lies down in the same lodging with him.

Object. According to the Commentary, there are three types of expulsion: Expulsion from communion (this applies only to bhikkhus and bhikkhunis, and refers to the act of suspension discussed under the preceding rule); expulsion from one's status; and expulsion as a punishment. Novices are subject to the latter two.

(1) The Mahavagga (I.60) lists ten grounds for expelling a novice from his status as a novice: He breaks any of his first five precepts, he speaks in dispraise of the Buddha, Dhamma, or Sangha; he holds to wrong views (such things as eternalism, fatalism or annihilationism, says the Commentary), or he rapes a bhikkhuni.

A novice who breaks any of his first five precepts has cut himself off from the Triple Refuge, from his teacher, and from his right to a lodging in a monastery. He is still a novice, though, and if he sees the error of his ways and is determined to restrain himself in the future, he may take the Triple Refuge from his teacher again and so be restored to his former status. (The Commentary says that a novice who knowingly drinks alcohol in defiance of the fifth precept may be restored to his status as a novice but may never ordain as a bhikkhu in this lifetime. Not all Communities share this view.)

If, though, he breaks any of these precepts habitually and is not determined to restrain himself in the future, he is to be expelled from his status as a novice.

As for the novice who holds to wrong views or who speaks in dispraise of the Buddha, Dhamma, or Sangha, the bhikkhus are to instruct him to show him the error of his ways. If he abandons his views, he is to undergo punishment for an appropriate period (see Mv.I.57-58) and then be allowed to confess his error, so as to return to his former status. If he does not change his ways, he is to be expelled from his status as a novice.

And as for the novice who rapes a bhikkhuni: The Commentary notes that this comes under the breaking of the third precept, but is listed separately because a novice who has sexual intercourse with anyone but a bhikkhuni may be reinstated if he sees the error of his ways, whereas one who has raped a bhikkhuni may not -- and furthermore, he can never be ordained as a novice or a bhikkhu in this lifetime.

Except in the last case, a novice who has been expelled from his status as a novice may be reordained as a novice if he sees his errors and can convince the bhikkhus that he will mend his ways in the future.

(2) The second form of expulsion -- expulsion as punishment -- is the one mentioned in this rule: A novice comes to think that there is nothing wrong with any novice's having sexual intercourse or breaking any of his other precepts. If he asserts this view, the bhikkhus are to instruct him to show that it is wrong, but if they cannot sway him, they are to expel him in the form described in the rule: He has no right to claim the Buddha as his teacher and loses his right to live in the same lodgings with the bhikkhus, although he retains his status as a novice. This form of expulsion lasts as long as he has yet to abandon his view. If and when he does abandon it, he is to be reinstated: The Commentary doesn't say how, but we can reason from the pattern mentioned above that he should take the Triple Refuge from his teacher again.

The Commentary states that the factor of object under this rule is fulfilled by a novice who has undergone expulsion as punishment and has yet to abandon his wrong view, but we might argue from the Great Standards to say that an ex-novice who has been expelled from his status as novice would fulfill the factor as well.

Perception. There is no offense in supporting, etc., an expelled novice if one does not know that he has been expelled; and a dukkata for supporting, etc., a novice if one is in doubt about the matter. This last penalty holds regardless of whether he has actually been expelled or not.

Effort here is fulfilled by any one of four sorts of action:

1) Supporting a novice means providing him with material requisites or instruction in the Dhamma, as a mentor would.

2) Receiving services from him means to accept the services a mentor normally receives from his student -- the Vibhanga mentions accepting powder, clay (soap) for washing, tooth-wood, or water for washing the face (%).

3 & 4) Consorting and lying down in the same lodging are defined as under the preceding rule.

Non-offenses. There is no offense in supporting, etc., a novice if one perceives that he has not been expelled, or if one knows that he has abandoned the view/position that led to his expulsion in the first place.

Summary: Supporting, receiving services from, consorting, or lying down under the same roof with an expelled novice -- knowing that he has been expelled -- is a pacittiya offense.