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Digha Nikaya 15

Maha-nidana Sutta (DN-15)

The Great Causes Discourse

Translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu.

For free distribution only.

Edited for readability and sensitivity for the language of gnosis and cognition, 02-22-05, by the contemplative recluse monk Sotapanna Jhanananda (Jeffrey S, Brooks)

Dependant Origination

I have heard that on one occasion the Blessed One was living among the Kurus. Now, the Kurus have a town named Kammasadhamma. There Ven. Ananda approached the Blessed One and, on arrival, having bowed down to the Blessed One, sat to one side. As he was sitting there he said to the Blessed One: "It's amazing, lord, it's astounding, how deep this dependent origination is, and how deep its appearance, and yet to me it seems as clear as clear can be."

[The Buddha:] "Don't say that, Ananda. Don't say that. Deep is this dependent origination, and deep its appearance. It's because of not understanding and not penetrating this philosophy (Dhamma) that this generation is like a tangled skein, a knotted ball of string, like matted rushes and reeds, and does not go beyond transmigration, beyond the planes of deprivation, woe, and bad destinations.

"If one is asked, 'Is there a demonstrable requisite condition for aging and death?' one should answer, 'There is.'

"If one is asked, 'From what requisite condition do aging and death come?' one should say, 'Aging and death come from birth as their requisite condition.'

"If one is asked, 'Is there a demonstrable requisite condition for birth?' one should answer, 'There is.'

"If one is asked, 'From what requisite condition does birth come?' one should say, 'Birth comes from becoming as its requisite condition.'

"If one is asked, 'Is there a demonstrable requisite condition for becoming?' one should answer, 'There is.'

"If one is asked, 'From what requisite condition does becoming come?' one should say, 'Becoming comes from clinging as its requisite condition.'

"If one is asked, 'Is there a demonstrable requisite condition for clinging?' one should answer, 'There is.'

"If one is asked, 'From what requisite condition does clinging come?' one should say, 'Clinging comes from craving as its requisite condition.'

"If one is asked, 'Is there a demonstrable requisite condition for craving?' one should answer, 'There is.'

"If one is asked, 'From what requisite condition does craving come?' one should say, 'Craving comes from sensation (vedana) as its requisite condition.'

"If one is asked, 'Is there a demonstrable requisite condition for sensation?' one should answer, 'There is.'

"If one is asked, 'From what requisite condition does sensation come?' one should say, 'Sensation comes from sensory stimulation as its requisite condition.'

"If one is asked, 'Is there a demonstrable requisite condition for sensory stimulation?' one should answer, 'There is.'

"If one is asked, 'From what requisite condition does sensory stimulation come?' one should say, 'Sensory stimulation comes from the objectification of concepts and appearances (nama-rupa) as its requisite condition.'

"If one is asked, 'Is there a demonstrable requisite condition for the objectification of concepts and appearances?' one should answer, 'There is.'

"If one is asked, 'From what requisite condition does the objectification of concepts and appearances come?' one should say, 'The objectification of concepts and appearances comes from cognition as its requisite condition.'

"If one is asked, 'Is there a demonstrable requisite condition for cognition?' one should answer, 'There is.'

"If one is asked, 'From what requisite condition does cognition come?' one should say, 'Cognition comes from the objectification of concepts and appearances as its requisite condition.'

"Thus, Ananda, from the objectification of concepts and appearances as a requisite condition comes cognition. From cognition as a requisite condition comes the objectification of concepts and appearances. From the objectification of concepts and appearances as a requisite condition comes sensory stimulation. From sensory stimulation as a requisite condition comes sensation. From sensation as a requisite condition comes craving. From craving as a requisite condition comes clinging. From clinging as a requisite condition comes becoming. From becoming as a requisite condition comes birth. From birth as a requisite condition, aging, death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, anxiety, and despair come into play. Such is the origination of this entire mass of anxiety.

Aging and Death

"'From birth as a requisite condition come aging and death.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how from birth as a requisite condition come aging and death. If there were no birth at all, in any way, of anything anywhere -- i.e., of devas in the state of devas, of celestials in the state of celestials, of spirits in the state of spirits, of demons in the state of demons, of human beings in the human state, of quadrupeds in the state of quadrupeds, of birds in the state of birds, of snakes in the state of snakes, or of any being in its own state -- in the utter absence of birth, from the cessation of birth, would aging and death be discerned?"

"No, lord."

"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for aging and death, i.e., birth.

Birth

"'From becoming as a requisite condition comes birth.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how from becoming as a requisite condition comes birth. If there were no becoming at all, in any way, of anything anywhere -- i.e., sensual becoming, form becoming, or formless becoming -- in the utter absence of becoming, from the cessation of becoming, would birth be discerned?"

"No, lord."

"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for birth, i.e., becoming.

Becoming

"'From clinging as a requisite condition comes becoming.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how from clinging as a requisite condition comes becoming. If there were no clinging at all, in any way, of anything anywhere -- i.e., clinging to sensuality, clinging to precepts and practices, clinging to views, or clinging to doctrines of the self -- in the utter absence of clinging, from the cessation of clinging, would becoming be discerned?"

"No, lord."

"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for becoming, i.e., clinging.

Clinging

"'From craving as a requisite condition comes clinging.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how from craving as a requisite condition comes clinging. If there were no craving at all, in any way, of anything anywhere -- i.e., craving for sensuality, craving for becoming, craving for no becoming -- in the utter absence of craving, from the cessation of craving, would clinging be discerned?"

"No, lord."

"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for clinging, i.e., craving.

Craving

"'From sensation as a requisite condition comes craving.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how from sensation as a requisite condition comes craving. If there were no sensation at all, in any way, of anything anywhere -- i.e., sensation born of visual sensory stimulation, sensation born of auditory sensory stimulation, sensation born of olfactory sensory stimulation, sensation born of taste sensory stimulation, sensation born of tactile sensory stimulation, or sensation born of sensory stimulation of the intellect -- in the utter absence of sensation, from the cessation of sensation, would craving be discerned?"

"No, lord."

"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for craving, i.e., sensation.

Dependent on Craving

"Now, craving is dependent upon sensation, seeking is dependent upon craving, acquisition is dependent upon seeking, ascertainment is dependent upon acquisition, desire and passion is dependent upon ascertainment, attachment is dependent upon desire and passion, possessiveness is dependent upon attachment, stinginess is dependent upon possessiveness, defensiveness is dependent upon stinginess, and because of defensiveness, dependent upon defensiveness, various evil, unskillful phenomena come into play: the taking up of sticks and knives; conflicts, quarrels, and disputes; accusations, divisive speech, and lies.

"And this is the way to understand how it is that because of defensiveness various evil, unskillful phenomena come into play: the taking up of sticks and knives; conflicts, quarrels, and disputes; accusations, divisive speech, and lies. If there were no defensiveness at all, in any way, of anything anywhere, in the utter absence of defensiveness, from the cessation of defensiveness, would various evil, unskillful phenomena -- the taking up of sticks and knives; conflicts, quarrels, and disputes; accusations, divisive speech, and lies -- come into play?"

"No, lord."

"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for the coming-into-play of various evil, unskillful phenomena -- the taking up of sticks and knives; conflicts, quarrels, and disputes; accusations, divisive speech, and lies -- i.e., defensiveness.

"'Defensiveness is dependent on stinginess.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how defensiveness is dependent on stinginess. If there were no stinginess at all, in any way, of anything anywhere, in the utter absence of stinginess, from the cessation of stinginess, would defensiveness be discerned?"

"No, lord."

"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for defensiveness, i.e., stinginess.

(Similarly back through the chain of conditions: stinginess, attachment, possessiveness, desire and passion, ascertainment, acquisition, and seeking.)

"'Seeking is dependent upon craving.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how seeking is dependent upon craving. If there were no craving at all, in any way, of anything anywhere -- i.e., craving for sensuality, craving for becoming, craving for no becoming -- in the utter absence of craving, from the cessation of craving, would seeking be discerned?"

"No, lord."

"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for seeking, i.e., craving. Thus, Ananda, these two phenomena [the chain of conditions leading from craving to birth, aging, and death, and the chain of conditions leading from craving to quarrels, etc.], as a duality, flow back into one place at sensation.

Sensation

"'From sensory stimulation as a requisite condition comes sensation.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how from sensory stimulation as a requisite condition comes sensation. If there were no sensory stimulation at all, in any way, of anything anywhere -- i.e., visual sensory stimulation, auditory sensory stimulation, olfactory sensory stimulation, taste sensory stimulation, tactile sensory stimulation, or sensory stimulation of the intellect -- in the utter absence of sensory stimulation, from the cessation of sensory stimulation, would sensation be discerned?"

"No, lord."

"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for sensation, i.e., sensory stimulation.

Sensory stimulation

"'From the objectification of concepts and appearances as a requisite condition comes sensory stimulation.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how, from the objectification of concepts and appearances as a requisite condition comes sensory stimulation. If the qualities, traits, themes, and indicators of concepts (nama) were all absent, would sensory stimulation with respect to appearances (rupa) be discerned?"

"No, lord."

"If the permutations, signs, themes, and indicators by which there is a description of appearance were all absent, would resistance to sensory stimulation with respect to appearances be discerned?"

"No, lord."

"If the permutations, signs, themes, and indicators by which there is a description of concepts and appearances were all absent, would designation-sensory stimulation or resistance-sensory stimulation be discerned?"

"No, lord."

"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for sensory stimulation, i.e., the objectification of concepts and appearances.

The objectification of concepts and appearances

"'From cognition as a requisite condition comes the objectification of concepts and appearances.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how from cognition as a requisite condition comes the objectification of concepts and appearances. If cognition were not to descend into the mother's womb, would the objectification of concepts and appearances take shape in the womb?"

"No, lord."

"If, after descending into the womb, cognition were to depart, would the objectification of concepts and appearances be produced for this world?"

"No, lord."

"If the cognition of the young boy or girl were to be cut off, would the objectification of concepts and appearances ripen, grow, and reach maturity?"

"No, lord."

"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for the objectification of concepts and appearances, i.e., cognition."

Cognition

"'From the objectification of concepts and appearances as a requisite condition comes cognition.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how from the objectification of concepts and appearances as a requisite condition comes cognition. If cognition were not to gain a foothold in the objectification of concepts and appearances, would a coming-into-play of the origination of birth, aging, death, and anxiety in the future be discerned?

"No, lord."

"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for cognition, i.e., the objectification of concepts and appearances.

"This is the extent to which there is birth, aging, death, passing away, and re-arising. This is the extent to which there are means of designation, expression, and delineation. This is the extent to which the sphere of discernment extends, the extent to which the cycle revolves for the manifesting (perceptibility) of this world -- i.e., the objectification of concepts and appearances together with cognition.

Delineations of a Self

"To what extent, Ananda, does one delineate when delineating a self? Either delineating a self possessed of form and finite, one delineates that 'My self is possessed of form and finite.' Or, delineating a self possessed of form and infinite, one delineates that 'My self is possessed of form and infinite.' Or, delineating a self formless and finite, one delineates that 'My self is formless and finite.' Or, delineating a self formless and infinite, one delineates that 'My self is formless and infinite.'

"Now, the one who, when delineating a self, delineates it as possessed of form and finite, either delineates it as possessed of form and finite in the present, or of such a nature that it will [naturally] become possessed of form and finite [in the future/after death], or he believes that 'Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.' This being the case, it is proper to say that a fixed view of a self possessed of form and finite obsesses him.

"The one who, when delineating a self, delineates it as possessed of form and infinite, either delineates it as possessed of form and infinite in the present, or of such a nature that it will [naturally] become possessed of form and infinite [in the future/after death], or he believes that 'Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.' This being the case, it is proper to say that a fixed view of a self possessed of form and infinite obsesses him.

"The one who, when delineating a self, delineates it as formless and finite, either delineates it as formless and finite in the present, or of such a nature that it will [naturally] become formless and finite [in the future/after death], or he believes that 'Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.' This being the case, it is proper to say that a fixed view of a self formless and finite obsesses him.

"The one who, when delineating a self, delineates it as formless and infinite, either delineates it as formless and infinite in the present, or of such a nature that it will [naturally] become formless and infinite [in the future/after death], or he believes that 'Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.' This being the case, it is proper to say that a fixed view of a self formless and infinite obsesses him.

Non-Delineations of a Self

"To what extent, Ananda, does one not delineate when not delineating a self? Either not delineating a self possessed of form and finite, one does not delineate that 'My self is possessed of form and finite.' Or, not delineating a self possessed of form and infinite, one does not delineate that 'My self is possessed of form and infinite.' Or, not delineating a self formless and finite, one does not delineate that 'My self is formless and finite.' Or, not delineating a self formless and infinite, one does not delineate that 'My self is formless and infinite.'

"Now, the one who, when not delineating a self, does not delineate it as possessed of form and finite, does not delineate it as possessed of form and finite in the present, nor does he delineate it as of such a nature that it will [naturally] become possessed of form and finite [in the future/after death], nor does he believe that 'Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.' This being the case, it is proper to say that a fixed view of a self possessed of form and finite does not obsess him.

"The one who, when not delineating a self, does not delineate it as possessed of form and infinite, does not delineate it as possessed of form and infinite in the present, nor does he delineate it as of such a nature that it will [naturally] become possessed of form and infinite [in the future/after death], nor does he believe that 'Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.' This being the case, it is proper to say that a fixed view of a self possessed of form and infinite does not obsess him.

"The one who, when not delineating a self, does not delineate it as formless and finite, does not delineate it as formless and finite in the present, nor does he delineate it as of such a nature that it will [naturally] become formless and finite [in the future/after death], nor does he believe that 'Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.' This being the case, it is proper to say that a fixed view of a self formless and finite does not obsess him.

"The one who, when not delineating a self, does not delineate it as formless and infinite, does not delineate it as formless and infinite in the present, nor does he delineate it as of such a nature that it will [naturally] become formless and infinite [in the future/after death], nor does he believe that 'Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.' This being the case, it is proper to say that a fixed view of a self formless and infinite does not obsess him.

Assumptions of a Self

"To what extent, Ananda, does one assume when assuming a self? Assuming sensation to be the self, one assumes that 'Sensation is my self' [or] 'Sensation is not my self: My self is oblivious [to sensation]' [or] 'Neither is sensation my self, nor is my self oblivious to sensation, but rather my self feels, in that my self is subject to sensation.'

"Now, one who says, 'Sensation is my self,' should be addressed as follows: 'There are these three sensations, my friend -- sensations of pleasure, sensations of pain, and sensations of neither pleasure nor pain. Which of these three sensations do you assume to be the self?' At a moment when a sensation of pleasure is sensed, no sensation of pain or of neither pleasure nor pain is sensed. Only a sensation of pleasure is sensed at that moment. At a moment when a sensation of pain is sensed, no sensation of pleasure or of neither pleasure nor pain is sensed. Only a sensation of pain is sensed at that moment. At a moment when a sensation of neither pleasure nor pain is sensed, no sensation of pleasure or of pain is sensed. Only a sensation of neither pleasure nor pain is sensed at that moment.

"Now, a sensation of pleasure is inconstant, fabricated, dependent on conditions, subject to passing away, dissolution, fading, and cessation. A sensation of pain is inconstant, fabricated, dependent upon conditions, subject to passing away, dissolution, fading, and cessation. A sensation of neither pleasure nor pain is inconstant, fabricated, dependent upon conditions, subject to passing away, dissolution, fading, and cessation. Having detected a sensation of pleasure as 'my self,' then with the cessation of one's very own sensation of pleasure, 'my self' has perished. Having detected a sensation of pain as 'my self,' then with the cessation of one's very own sensation of pain, 'my self' has perished. Having detected a sensation of neither pleasure nor pain as 'my self,' then with the cessation of one's very own sensation of neither pleasure nor pain, 'my self' has perished.

"Thus he assumes, assuming in the immediate present a self inconstant, entangled in pleasure and pain, subject to arising and passing away, he who says, 'Sensation is my self.' Thus in this manner, Ananda, one does not see fit to assume sensation to be the self.

"As for the person who says, 'Sensation is not the self: My self is oblivious [to sensation],' he should be addressed as follows: 'My friend, where nothing whatsoever is observed at all, would there be the thought, "I am"?'"

"No, lord."

"Thus in this manner, Ananda, one does not see fit to assume that 'Sensation is not my self: My self is oblivious [to sensation].'

"As for the person who says, 'Neither is sensation my self, nor is my self oblivious [to sensation], but rather my self feels, in that my self is subject to sensation,' he should be addressed as follows: 'My friend, should sensations altogether and every way stop without remainder, then with sensation completely not existing, owing to the cessation of sensation, would there be the thought, "I am"?'"

"No, lord."

"Thus in this manner, Ananda, one does not see fit to assume that 'Neither is sensation my self, nor is my self oblivious [to sensation], but rather my self feels, in that my self is subject to sensation.'

"Now, Ananda, in as far as a monk does not assume sensation to be the self, nor the self as oblivious, nor that 'My self feels, in that my self is subject to sensation,' then, not assuming in this way, he is not sustained by anything (does not cling to anything) in the world. Not sustained, he is not agitated. Not agitated, he is totally unbound right within. He discerns that 'Birth is ended, the holy life fulfilled, the task done. There is nothing further for this world.'

"If anyone were to say with regard to a monk whose mind is thus released that 'The Tathagata exists after death,' is his view, that would be mistaken; that 'The Tathagata does not exist after death'... that 'The Tathagata both exists and does not exist after death'... that 'The Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist after death' is his view, that would be mistaken. Why? Having directly known the extent of designation and the extent of the objects of designation, the extent of expression and the extent of the objects of expression, the extent of description and the extent of the objects of description, the extent of discernment and the extent of the objects of discernment, the extent to which the cycle revolves: Having directly known that, the monk is released. [To say that,] 'The monk released, having directly known that, does not see, does not know is his opinion,' that would be mistaken. [1]

Seven Stations of Cognition

"Ananda, there are these seven stations of cognition and two spheres. Which seven?

"There are beings with various forms and various of perceptions, such as human beings, some devas, and some beings in the lower realms. This is the first station of cognition.

"There are beings with various forms and singularity of perception, such as the devas of the Brahma hosts generated by the first [jhana] and some beings in the four realms of deprivation. This is the second station of cognition. [2]

"There are beings with singularity of form and various perceptions, such as the Radiant Devas. This is the third station of cognition.

"There are beings with singularity of form and singularity of perception, such as the Beautifully Lustrous Devas. This is the fourth station of cognition. (fourth jhana)

"There are beings who,with the complete transcending of physical sensory perception, with the disappearance of perceivable resistance, and not drawn to various perceptions, thinking, 'Infinite space,' arrive at the dimension of the infinitude of space. This is the fifth station of cognition. (fifth jhana)

"There are beings who, with the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of space, perceiving [3], 'Infinite consciousness,' arrive at the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness. This is the sixth station of cognition. (sixth jhana)

"There are beings who, with the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness, perceiving, 'There is nothing,' arrive at the dimension of nothingness. This is the seventh station of cognition. (seventh jhana)

"The dimension of non-percipient beings and, second, the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception. [These are the two spheres.]

"Now, as for the first station of cognition -- beings with diversity of body and diversity of perception, such as human beings, some devas, and some beings in the lower realms: If one discerns that [station of cognition], discerns its origination, discerns its passing away, discerns its allure, discerns its drawbacks, discerns the escape from it, would it be proper, by means of that [discernment] to take delight there?"

"No, lord."

(Similarly with each of the remaining stations of cognition and two spheres.)

"Ananda, when knowing -- as they actually are -- the origination, passing away, allure, drawbacks of -- and escape from -- these seven stations of cognition and two spheres, a monk is released through lack of clinging, he is said to be a monk released through discernment.

Eight Emancipations

"Ananda, there are these eight emancipations. Which eight?

"Possessed of form, one perceives form. This is the first emancipation. (2nd jhana)

"Not percipient of appearances internally, one observes physical sensations. This is the second emancipation. (3rd jhana)

"One is intent only upon the beautiful (piti and sukha). This is the third emancipation. (4th jhana)

"With the complete transcending of the physical senses, with the disappearance of resistance, and not heeding various perceptions, perceiving, 'Infinite space,' one enters and remains in the dimension of the infinitude of space. This is the fourth emancipation. (5th jhana)

"With the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of space, thinking, 'Infinite consciousness,' one enters and remains in the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness. This is the fifth emancipation. (6th jhana)

"With the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness, perceiving, 'There is nothing,' one enters and remains in the dimension of nothingness. This is the sixth emancipation. (7^th jhana)

"With the complete transcending of the dimension of nothingness, one enters and remains in the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception. This is the seventh emancipation. (8^th jhana)

"With the complete transcending of the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception, one enters and remains in the cessation of perception and sensation. This is the eighth emancipation. (nibbana)

"Now, when a monk attains these eight emancipations in forward order, in reverse order, in forward and reverse order, when he attains them and emerges from them wherever he wants, however he wants, and for as long as he wants, when through the ending of the mental activity he enters and remains in awareness-release and discernment-release free of mental activity, having directly known it and realized it in the here and now, he is said to be a monk released in both ways. And as for another release in both ways, higher or more sublime than this, there is none."

That is what the Blessed One said. Gratified, Ven. Ananda delighted in the Blessed One's words.

Notes:

Notes from Thanissaro Bhikkhu:

1. The various readings for this sentence all seem to be corrupt. The sense of the paragraph, read in light of AN X.96, demands that the view expressed in the last sentence be about the monk released, unlike the four earlier views, which are wrongly attributed to the monk released. In other words, the monk released has no opinion on the question of whether the Tathagata does, doesn't, etc., exist after death. This might lead to the supposition that his lack of opinion comes from a lack of knowledge or vision. The description of what he comes to know in the course of gaining release shows that this supposition is inappropriate. He does know, he does see, and what he knows and sees about the limitations of language and concepts shows him that the question of the existence of the Tathagata after death should be set aside.

Thus I would reconstruct the Pali of the final sentence in this paragraph as: Tadabhi––aa vimutto bhikkhu na jaanaati na passati iti saa ditthi tadakallam.

2.This reading follows the Thai edition of the Pali Canon. Other editions omit the statement, "and some beings in the four realms of deprivation." However, something like the Thai reading seems called for, inasmuch as the first station of cognition covers only some of the beings in the lower realms. [Go back]